Years ago, second lien lenders adhered to the truism about children -- they were seen but not heard. As our children have grown more vocal in recent years, so too have second lien lenders. A spate of recent bankruptcy cases demonstrate that second lien lenders have been both seen and heard at many critical junctures in the chapter 11 timeline -- at the sale of the debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code,1 in seeking the appointment of an examiner,2 when voting on a chapter 11 plan,3 and in connection with the confirmation hearing.4

The rapid evolution of a robust secondary market for claims against the three largest failed Icelandic banks provides a powerful example of the prompt adaptation of an existing secondary-market legal framework -- originally developed in the US and Europe -- to a complex and novel bankruptcy regime and trading environment.

In the jargon of the secondary bank loan market, loans beneficially owned by participation may be "elevated" to direct assignments once requisite administrative agent and/or borrower consent is obtained. Such "elevations" customarily have been viewed as straightforward transactions -- when completed, the participant simply stands in the shoes of the grantor and becomes the lender of record of the loan on the books of the administrative agent.

In the wake of the recent financial crisis, the legal system continues to sort out rights and obligations of financial market participants. This is especially true for participants in the over-the-counter derivatives markets.

The tremendous growth of that largely unregulated market has been accompanied by the development of sophisticated contractual frameworks and specific bankruptcy legislation expressly intended to reduce uncertainty around the amount and type of claims that could ultimately be asserted by market participants following bankruptcy of a derivative counterparty.

T he recent surge in activity in the claims trading market in the wake of Lehman Brothers and other high-profile bankruptcies has created a backlog of open trades and heightened price volatility. This is a perilous combination. The lack of standardized trading documentation and uniform trading conventions, as well as the dramatic influx of new counterparties into the claims market, are factors that have contributed to longer settlement timeframes and increased uncertainty in the market.

In our Distressed Investor Alert dated December 23, 2009, we wrote that Bankruptcy Rule 2019, an often ignored procedural rule in U.S. bankruptcies, had returned to the public eye in light of the controversial revisions to Rule 2019 (“Revised Rule 2019”)1 proposed by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (the "Rules Committee").

Scenario:

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) and its affiliate and subsidiary debtors (collectively, “Lehman”) filed their proposed chapter 11 plan of reorganization in their jointly administered chapter 11 proceedings on Monday, March 15, 2010 (Docket No. 7572). Monday was the last day for Lehman to file a plan pursuant to section 1121(d) of the Bankruptcy Code in order for Lehman to maintain the exclusive right to file and obtain confirmation of a plan.¹

Bankruptcy Rule 2019, an often ignored procedural rule in U.S. bankruptcies, has returned to the public eye with a vengeance in light of a recent ruling by the influential Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware¹ and controversial pending amendments to Rule 2019 proposed by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (the “Rules Committee”). The amendments will be the subject of a public hearing held in New York City on February 5, 2010.²

Courts are now being asked to examine transactions which were completed during the recent exuberant period. Despite the fact that the transactions in question may have been market standard at the time, because those transactions are being scrutinized during an unprecedented economic crisis, it appears that a disproportionate amount of finger pointing – and economic loss – is being directed at secured creditors. The result is a seeming erosion of secured creditors’ rights for the benefit of unsecured creditors.