With the future of the New York City Off Track Betting Corp. up in the air, the New York Senate returned to the Capitol Tuesday, Dec. 7, to find itself in the middle of a long-standing battle between tracks and OTB corporations in the state.
Officials at the NYCOTB, which is in Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection, vowed to shut down the stateowned betting giant at midnight Dec. 7 if the Senate does not pass a reorganization bill already approved last week by the Assembly.
Years ago, second lien lenders adhered to the truism about children -- they were seen but not heard. As our children have grown more vocal in recent years, so too have second lien lenders. A spate of recent bankruptcy cases demonstrate that second lien lenders have been both seen and heard at many critical junctures in the chapter 11 timeline -- at the sale of the debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code,1 in seeking the appointment of an examiner,2 when voting on a chapter 11 plan,3 and in connection with the confirmation hearing.4
The rapid evolution of a robust secondary market for claims against the three largest failed Icelandic banks provides a powerful example of the prompt adaptation of an existing secondary-market legal framework -- originally developed in the US and Europe -- to a complex and novel bankruptcy regime and trading environment.
In the jargon of the secondary bank loan market, loans beneficially owned by participation may be "elevated" to direct assignments once requisite administrative agent and/or borrower consent is obtained. Such "elevations" customarily have been viewed as straightforward transactions -- when completed, the participant simply stands in the shoes of the grantor and becomes the lender of record of the loan on the books of the administrative agent.
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, the legal system continues to sort out rights and obligations of financial market participants. This is especially true for participants in the over-the-counter derivatives markets.
The tremendous growth of that largely unregulated market has been accompanied by the development of sophisticated contractual frameworks and specific bankruptcy legislation expressly intended to reduce uncertainty around the amount and type of claims that could ultimately be asserted by market participants following bankruptcy of a derivative counterparty.
T he recent surge in activity in the claims trading market in the wake of Lehman Brothers and other high-profile bankruptcies has created a backlog of open trades and heightened price volatility. This is a perilous combination. The lack of standardized trading documentation and uniform trading conventions, as well as the dramatic influx of new counterparties into the claims market, are factors that have contributed to longer settlement timeframes and increased uncertainty in the market.
Title II of the Act, designated "Orderly Liquidation Authority" – effective July 21, 2010 – establishes what is intended to be an orderly liquidation process for "financial companies" whose collapse or potential collapse are determined to constitute a risk to the financial system as a whole. Such systemically significant institutions would be liquidated under these new procedures, rather than being treated under existing bankruptcy laws. (The intent of Act is that most-failing financial companies will continue to be administered under existing bankruptcy laws.)
With a growing number of projects facing financial difficulty, the importance of maintaining leverage for securing payment is greater than ever. The project itself remains a prime security target for any contractor, subcontractor or supplier for assuring appropriate attention is given to their claims and that payment will be forthcoming in a timely and unencumbered manner. Some very recent developments in the lien realm emphasize the ongoing attention that is being given to lien statutes and the opportunity they provide for maximizing those considerations of security and leverage.
In our Distressed Investor Alert dated December 23, 2009, we wrote that Bankruptcy Rule 2019, an often ignored procedural rule in U.S. bankruptcies, had returned to the public eye in light of the controversial revisions to Rule 2019 (“Revised Rule 2019”)1 proposed by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (the "Rules Committee").