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In a 2-1 opinion, the Second Circuit overruled the district court in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp., finding no violation of the Trust Indenture Act (“TIA”) in connection with an out-of-court debt restructuring.

Background

The European Commission (EC) announced proposals on 22 November 2016, which are intended to harmonise national insolvency laws across the EU through a proposed directive “on preventative restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures” (Directive). The Directive will need to be passed by the European Council and European Parliament. Then, EU Member States would be required to adopt the Directive’s provisions into their respective national laws within two years from the date of its entry into force.

The Barton doctrine (named after the U.S. Supreme Court case Barton v. Barbour, 104 US 126 (1881)), generally prohibits suits against receivers and bankruptcy trustees in forums other than the appointing courts, absent appointing court's permission. It applies to suits that involve actions done in the officers' official capacity and within their authority as officers of the court.

When this topic was last considered two years ago, there was a real danger of pension rights (previously thought of as sacrosanct) being within the reach of trustees in bankruptcy by way of an income payments order (IPO). There were also two conflicting first instance decisions in play. The issue? Whether a pension entitlement capable of drawdown by election, but not yet in payment, can fall within the definition of income in section 310(7) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA86), and so be the potential subject of an IPO.

Savers who become bankrupt but have not yet drawn their pensions will not have to hand them to creditors after a ruling of the Court of Appeal put an end to fears that pension pots were at risk.

The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s ruling on Horton v Henry, originally heard in 2014, settling legal difficulties arising from a conflicting judgment of Raithatha v Williamson (2012); and the introduction of the pension freedoms.

Circuit held that when a chapter 11 debtor cures a default under its loan agreements, the debtor is required to pay default interest as required by the loan documents, rather than at the non-default rate.

The Housing and Planning Act changes what happens to insolvent housing associations, says Séamas Gray in an article for Inside Housing.

Traditionally, when a company becomes insolvent, it enters one of several types of insolvency processes and its assets are typically sold to the highest bidder to raise as much money as possible to distribute to the company’s creditors.

In relation to a housing association, this might well mean a sale outside the regulated sector with the knock-on effect of an immediate reduction in available social housing.

In Princeton Office Park, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy and district court rulings that the purchaser of a NJ tax sale certificate forfeited its claim and lien because it included the premium it paid to the State when it purchased the tax certificate.

Key points:

  • While DIP Lenders rightfully negotiate for super-priority administrative expenses which trump post conversion chapter 7 administrative expenses, these provisions are not uniformly enforced.

  • DIP Lenders should require the inclusion of specific language providing that section 364(c)(1) super-priority claims have priority over chapter 7 administrative expense claims, including those to be incurred by a chapter 7 trustee above the agreed upon “burial expenses.”  

A substantive non-consolidation opinion is a common feature of structured finance transactions in the U.S. Most, if not all, opine as to what a bankruptcy court would do, but express no opinion on the appellate process. We would venture a guess that most opinion recipients assume that if the bankruptcy court gets it wrong, their rights will be vindicated on appeal. The Eighth Circuit opinion in Opportunity Finance1 casts a troubling shadow over that assumption.

Background