A debtor ordinarily may discharge debts in bankruptcy, unless one of several exceptions apply. One of the preclusions to dischargeability of certain debts, found in Section 523(a)(19) of the U.S.
No, says the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in In re Cowen, adopting the minority rule and parting ways with four other Courts of Appeals.
One of the most powerful and oft used devices in bankruptcy is the sale of assets “free and clear” of liens, claims and interests. One issue a buyer at a bankruptcy sale must consider, however, is whether due process has been met with respect to parties whose liens, claims and/or interests are released through such sale. Indeed, a lack of due process could foil a “free and clear” sale, leaving a buyer with an encumbered purchase and nowhere to turn for recourse.
There are numerous reasons why a company might use more than one entity for its operations or organization: to silo liabilities, for tax advantages, to accommodate a lender, or for general organizational purposes. Simply forming a separate entity, however, is not enough. Corporate formalities must be followed or a court could effectively collapse the separate entities into one. A recent opinion by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts, Lassman v.
The doctrine of substantive consolidation (generally- the power of a bankruptcy court to consolidate the assets and liabilities of affiliated entities in bankruptcy) is a recognized remedy exercised by bankruptcy courts – one that strikes fear into the hearts of many lenders. Justifiably so. The doctrine can be employed to order the substantive consolidation of related-debtor entities in bankruptcy and it can also be employed to substantively consolidate the assets of a debtor in bankruptcy with those of a related entity that is not a debtor in bankruptcy.
In a 2-1 opinion, the Second Circuit overruled the district court in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp., finding no violation of the Trust Indenture Act (“TIA”) in connection with an out-of-court debt restructuring.
Background
The European Commission (EC) announced proposals on 22 November 2016, which are intended to harmonise national insolvency laws across the EU through a proposed directive “on preventative restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures” (Directive). The Directive will need to be passed by the European Council and European Parliament. Then, EU Member States would be required to adopt the Directive’s provisions into their respective national laws within two years from the date of its entry into force.
The linked Mintz Levin client advisory discusses a recent Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that held a “make-whole” optional redemption premium to be due upon a refinancing of corporate debt following its automatic acceleration upon bankruptcy.
The Barton doctrine (named after the U.S. Supreme Court case Barton v. Barbour, 104 US 126 (1881)), generally prohibits suits against receivers and bankruptcy trustees in forums other than the appointing courts, absent appointing court's permission. It applies to suits that involve actions done in the officers' official capacity and within their authority as officers of the court.
In a recent decision (“Energy Future Holdings”) poised to have wide-reaching implications, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decisions of the Bankruptcy and the District Courts to hold that a debtor cannot use a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing to escape liability for a “make-whole” premium if express contractual language requires such payment when the borrower makes an optional redemption prior to a date certain.