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In most bankruptcies, the company decides to file for relief. In involuntary bankruptcies, creditors force the company into bankruptcy. Involuntary petitions are an extreme remedy, and therefore the requirements and standards to meet for filing such petitions are strictly construed and applied. If creditors meet the requirements under the Bankruptcy Code for filing an involuntary petition, it can serve as a powerful tool to use against a debtor.

Key Issues

On July 19, 2024, Judge Michael Wiles of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a ruling in In re Mercon Coffee Corporation, Case No. 23-11945, invalidating insider releases in a proposed chapter 11 plan on the basis that the releases were improper retention-related transfers.

Judge Wiles found that he could not approve the releases – even though the debtors had promised them and insiders had relied upon that promise – because the releases did not meet the strict requirements of Bankruptcy Code Section 503(c).

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma, the US Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision held that the US Bankruptcy Code does not permit a debtor to confirm a chapter 11 plan that releases non-debtors from similar or related claims the creditors could assert directly against them.

In today's rapidly evolving business landscape, businesses find themselves at the intersection of technological innovation and geopolitical and economic turbulence. Despite the increased reliance on software systems and digital infrastructure, it remains peculiar that in many EU Member States there's still no clear framework for handling software licenses in insolvency.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize bankruptcy courts to confirm a Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan that discharges creditors’ claims against third parties without the consent of the affected claimants. The decision rejects the bankruptcy plan of Purdue Pharma, which had released members of the Sackler family from liability for their role in the opioid crisis. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority decision. Justice Kavanaugh dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor.

Unlike traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, sometimes called "free fall" cases, where a debtor files for bankruptcy and determines its path out of bankruptcy over the course of the following months, some debtors enter into bankruptcy with a plan entirely (or mostly) drafted, with an emergence strategy already completed. In these cases, debtors enter bankruptcy with pre-packaged plans or pre-negotiated plans (sometimes called pre-arranged plans) ready to file on or just after their petition date.

Today, in Office of the United States Trustee v. John Q Hammons Fall 2006, LLC, the Supreme Court held that debtors who paid fees in bankruptcy cases administered by the U.S. Trustee Program are not entitled to any relief, even though the Court previously ruled that those debtors had been unconstitutionally overcharged. This decision is the culmination of several years of litigation concerning differential fee structures across judicial districts.

In a bankruptcy case, a preference action1 is often asserted pursuant to Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code against a creditor to claw back funds paid to the creditor in the 90 days prior to the bankruptcy. While the most common defenses to a preference action are the ordinary course of business defense2, the new value defense3, and the contemporaneous exchange for new value defense4, there are other defenses that a savvy creditor should consider to reduce or even eliminate preference liability.

Key Issues

This morning, the Supreme Court decided Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., which clarifies that any party with a "direct financial stake in the outcome" of a reorganization has standing as a "party in interest" to object to a Chapter 11 plan. 11 U.S.C. 1109(b). Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Sotomayor held that the debtor's insurer has standing to object even if the plan purports to preserve the insurer's legal rights and thus is said to be "insurance neutral."