The U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision on May 29, 2012, finding that a chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of liquidation is not confirmable over a secured lender’s objection if such plan prohibits the lender from credit bidding at a sale of its collateral.1 See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC et al. v. Amalgamated Bank, No. 11-166, 566 U.S. ___ (2012).
In a major victory for secured creditors, the United States Supreme Court, on May 29, 2012, unanimously held that a chapter 11 plan involving a sale of secured property must afford the secured creditor the right to credit bid for the property under section 363(k) of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).1 In so holding, the Supreme Court resolved the split that had emerged among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, as illustrated by the Seventh Circuit’s decision below,2 which contrasted with recent decisions from the Third and Fifth Circui
On May 14, 2012, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., et al., No. 11-1889 (3d Cir. May 14, 2012) clarified the burden of proof with respect to the valuation and ultimate allowance of alleged secured claims under Bankruptcy Code section 506(a).
In Senior Transeastern Lenders v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re TOUSA, Inc.), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (the “Bankruptcy Court”) in which the Bankruptcy Court avoided the liens given by TOUSA’s subsidiaries to new lenders and permitted the recovery of the proceeds of the new loan from other TOUSA lenders that had taken the funds in repayment of their TOUSA guaranteed loans.
In October 2009, the court overseeing the TOUSA, Inc. bankruptcy cases in the Southern District of Florida (Bankruptcy Court) set off considerable alarm bells throughout the lending community when it unraveled a refinancing transaction as a fraudulent conveyance based upon, in primary part, the fact that certain subsidiaries of TOUSA, Inc. pledged their assets as collateral for a new loan that was used to repay prior debt on which the subsidiaries were not liable, and that was not secured by those subsidiaries’ assets.
Introduction
Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision inAT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that California’s rule against compulsory arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The Court also underscored the key points of an enforceable arbitration clause. Kilgore v. KeyBank (March 7, 2012).
Case Background
In the most recent ruling in long-running litigation styled AMG National Trust Bank v. Ries, NO. 06-CV4337, 09-cv-3061 (E.D. Pa.) (decided Dec.
Once triggered by a debtor's bankruptcy petition, the automatic stay suspends a parties' right to commence or continue an action against property of the debtor’s estate. In general, a party can seek relief from the automatic stay for a variety of reasons, including for cause, lack of adequate protection or that the debtor has no equity in the property and the property is not necessary for reorganization. In a case of first impression, a district court in Pennsylvania has found that an injunction enforcing a non-compete provision in a franchise agreement was not a "claim" against t
On August 16, 2011, the Second Circuit held that Irving H. Picard, the Trustee for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC ("Trustee"), utilized the correct methodology to determine the "net equity" of each Madoff investor under the Securities Investor Protection Act ("SIPA").