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In Senior Transeastern Lenders v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re TOUSA, Inc.), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (the “Bankruptcy Court”) in which the Bankruptcy Court avoided the liens given by TOUSA’s subsidiaries to new lenders and permitted the recovery of the proceeds of the new loan from other TOUSA lenders that had taken the funds in repayment of their TOUSA guaranteed loans.

Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision inAT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that California’s rule against compulsory arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The Court also underscored the key points of an enforceable arbitration clause. Kilgore v. KeyBank (March 7, 2012).

Case Background

Once triggered by a debtor's bankruptcy petition, the automatic stay suspends a parties' right to commence or continue an action against property of the debtor’s estate. In general, a party can seek relief from the automatic stay for a variety of reasons, including for cause, lack of adequate protection or that the debtor has no equity in the property and the property is not necessary for reorganization. In a case of first impression, a district court in Pennsylvania has found that an injunction enforcing a non-compete provision in a franchise agreement was not a "claim" against t

On August 16, 2011, the Second Circuit held that Irving H. Picard, the Trustee for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC ("Trustee"), utilized the correct methodology to determine the "net equity" of each Madoff investor under the Securities Investor Protection Act ("SIPA").

On June 28, 2011, the Second Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, held that Bankruptcy Code section 546(e) shields from avoidance in bankruptcy cases an issuer's payments to redeem its commercial paper prior to maturity. See Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de CV, Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. ALFA, S.A.B. de C.V., Nos. 09-5122-bk(L), 09-5142-bk (Con), 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13177 (2d Cir. June 28, 2011). The decision marks the first time an appeals court has considered whether redemption payments constitute "settlement payments" under section 546(e).

Generally speaking, the policy of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) is not to interfere with secured creditors, leaving them free to realize upon their security. While this makes sense in the abstract, the question that is most often posed by secured creditors is “what does this mean in a practical sense?  What exactly do I need to do to retrieve my secured asset?”

The Seventh Circuit recently held that a chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of liquidation is not confirmable over a secured lender's objection if such plan prohibits the lender from credit bidding at a sale of its collateral. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit split with the Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal which have confirmed plans that block secured creditors' rights to credit bid, potentially making the issue ripe for review by the United States Supreme Court.

Last month, the United States Court of Appeals in two separate circuits held that liability insurers have standing as parties in interest to appear and be heard in an insured's Chapter 11 case where the insurer might be liable to indemnify the claims of the insured's creditors.

Prior to the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code1 (BAFJA), there was a split as to whether a transfer of title to real estate by virtue of a mortgage foreclosure constituted a transfer as defined in §101 of the Bankruptcy Code.2, 3 However, BAFJA made it clear that a “transfer” included “the foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption.”4 This change in definition has a significant impact on the application of both §547 (preference) and §548 (fraudulent transfer).