In January 2017, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its widely reported opinion in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC vs. Education Management Corp., in which the majority held that the “right ... to receive payment” set forth in Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA) prohibits only nonconsensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms and does not protect the practical ability of bondholders to recover payment.

Background

An unexpected controversy has arisen recently in the high-yield bond market, one involving limiting the available remedies following default in the wake of last year’s decision by the Southern District of New York in Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v.

Borrowers, agent banks, syndicate members and secondary market purchasers incur, syndicate, sell and buy bank debt on the assumption that bank debt is not a “security.” However, a June 30, 2016, opinion in the General Motors preference litigation¹shows that such an assumption may no longer be valid, at least under the Bankruptcy Code.

Several recent cases in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York have created ambiguity about when distressed exchange offers violate Section 316(b) of the 1939 Trust Indenture Act (the “TIA”). It appears that plaintiffs’ lawyers are using this ambiguity to challenge distressed exchange offers. The threat of litigation may give minority bondholders a powerful tool to hinder less than fully consensual out-of-court restructurings and provide them with increased leverage in negotiations.

Market participants involved in distressed exchange offers have become accustomed to grappling with the implications of Trust Indenture Act Section 316(b) in the context of potential exit consents, i.e., are the contemplated amendments to the indenture governing the securities subject to the exchange significant enough to impair or affect the right of a holder to receive payment of principal and interest on or after the due dates of the relevant note?

A typical bond indenture provides that prior to the incurrence of an event of default, a trustee’s obligations are limited to those specifically set forth in the indenture. It is only following the occurrence of an event of default that the trustee’s duties of prudent conduct seem to ripen. This often leaves trustees and bondholders in a state of uncertainty over what actions, if any, a trustee may be obligated to take as the financial condition of an issuer worsens but has not yet crossed the default line. A recent case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Becker v.

The Bottom Line:

Parent company guarantees and performance bonds are typically used in the construction and engineering industries to provide a developer with some security in the event that the contractor breaches the building or engineering contract or, in some circumstances, upon the contractor's insolvency.

In the current economic climate, contractor default is, unfortunately, even more prevalent in the construction and engineering industries, and so the issues surrounding parent company guarantees and performance bonds are very much in focus for developers.

While many amendments to bond indentures can be made without consent from all bondholders, “non-impairment” clauses provide that the indenture may not be amended or restructured in any way that will affect or impair a bondholder’s right to receive principal and interest when due without unanimous consent.

On the Friday before Labor Day, Judge James Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York shocked the distressed bond market by dismissing the preference and fraudulent transfer counts of Iridium LLC Creditors Committee’s $3.7 billion adversary proceeding against Motorola, Inc. Judge Peck found that the Committee had failed to prove that Iridium was insolvent at any time—even the day before bankruptcy. Iridium’s $1.6 billion in bonds dropped from the mid-20s to low single digits in days.