The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found in favor of the trustee (the Trustee) presiding over the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (BMIS), affirming the Trustee’s calculation of “net equity” in the BMIS liquidation. The Trustee calculates net equity to determine the value of claims submitted by victims of Madoff’s massive fraud.

On June 28, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit became the latest circuit to weigh in on the hotly contested question of whether a debtor can deny a secured creditor the right to credit bid as part of a Chapter 11 plan providing for the sale of assets encumbered by the secured creditor’s liens. InIn re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC,1 the Seventh Circuit upheld the right of secured creditors to credit bid, a decision that runs directly contrary to recent opinions in the Third and Fifth Circuits.

The Seventh Circuit recently held that a chapter 11 bankruptcy plan of liquidation is not confirmable over a secured lender's objection if such plan prohibits the lender from credit bidding at a sale of its collateral. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit split with the Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal which have confirmed plans that block secured creditors' rights to credit bid, potentially making the issue ripe for review by the United States Supreme Court.

In a long awaited action, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) issued a final rule on July 6 which addresses the FDIC's rights and powers as receiver of a nonviable systemic financial company under the orderly liquidation authority provisions of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

Last month, the United States Court of Appeals in two separate circuits held that liability insurers have standing as parties in interest to appear and be heard in an insured's Chapter 11 case where the insurer might be liable to indemnify the claims of the insured's creditors.

Prior to the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code1 (BAFJA), there was a split as to whether a transfer of title to real estate by virtue of a mortgage foreclosure constituted a transfer as defined in §101 of the Bankruptcy Code.2, 3 However, BAFJA made it clear that a “transfer” included “the foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption.”4 This change in definition has a significant impact on the application of both §547 (preference) and §548 (fraudulent transfer).  

The second priority lien held by a junior lien holder is a property interest sufficient to trigger the protection of the automatic stay.In re Three Strokes L.P., 379 B.R. 804 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2008). Inasmuch as a senior lien holder’s foreclosure proceedings would have the effect of extinguishing the debtor’s second lien interest, a court may only lift the stay and permit the foreclosure to proceed upon such senior lien holder’s showing of adequate protection.

In a recent decision, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that an investor in a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit ("REMIC") lacked standing to object to the sale of a chapter 11 debtor's real property, despite that the property served as collateral for loans held in trust by the REMIC for the benefit of its investors.

The Court of Chancery of Delaware ruled that counsel failed to establish "excusable neglect" when it requested additional time to submit an expert witness report after the deadline for that report—as provided for in the court's previously issued scheduling order—had expired.

Reversing a controversial decision and judgment of the bankruptcy court, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida has held that a group of lenders who received payment in settlement of their defaulted debt from the proceeds of new loans secured by the assets of certain subsidiaries of TOUSA, Inc. which were not themselves liable on that debt, did not receive fraudulent transfers.