The doctrine of substantive consolidation (generally- the power of a bankruptcy court to consolidate the assets and liabilities of affiliated entities in bankruptcy) is a recognized remedy exercised by bankruptcy courts – one that strikes fear into the hearts of many lenders. Justifiably so. The doctrine can be employed to order the substantive consolidation of related-debtor entities in bankruptcy and it can also be employed to substantively consolidate the assets of a debtor in bankruptcy with those of a related entity that is not a debtor in bankruptcy.
In a 2-1 opinion, the Second Circuit overruled the district court in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp., finding no violation of the Trust Indenture Act (“TIA”) in connection with an out-of-court debt restructuring.
Background
The First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel recently issued a decision recognizing the rights of trademark licensees when the trademark’s owner files for bankruptcy.
Attributable to Amanda Remus, spokeswoman for Irving H. Picard, SIPA Trustee for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS) and his counsel:
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York today approved the SIPA Trustee's request for an allocation of approximately $342 million in recoveries to the BLMIS Customer Fund and has authorized the SIPA Trustee to proceed with the eighth pro rata interim distribution from the Customer Fund to BLMIS customers with allowed claims.
The European Commission (EC) announced proposals on 22 November 2016, which are intended to harmonise national insolvency laws across the EU through a proposed directive “on preventative restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures” (Directive). The Directive will need to be passed by the European Council and European Parliament. Then, EU Member States would be required to adopt the Directive’s provisions into their respective national laws within two years from the date of its entry into force.
The Barton doctrine (named after the U.S. Supreme Court case Barton v. Barbour, 104 US 126 (1881)), generally prohibits suits against receivers and bankruptcy trustees in forums other than the appointing courts, absent appointing court's permission. It applies to suits that involve actions done in the officers' official capacity and within their authority as officers of the court.
Circuit held that when a chapter 11 debtor cures a default under its loan agreements, the debtor is required to pay default interest as required by the loan documents, rather than at the non-default rate.
In Princeton Office Park, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy and district court rulings that the purchaser of a NJ tax sale certificate forfeited its claim and lien because it included the premium it paid to the State when it purchased the tax certificate.
Key points:
While DIP Lenders rightfully negotiate for super-priority administrative expenses which trump post conversion chapter 7 administrative expenses, these provisions are not uniformly enforced.
DIP Lenders should require the inclusion of specific language providing that section 364(c)(1) super-priority claims have priority over chapter 7 administrative expense claims, including those to be incurred by a chapter 7 trustee above the agreed upon “burial expenses.”
A substantive non-consolidation opinion is a common feature of structured finance transactions in the U.S. Most, if not all, opine as to what a bankruptcy court would do, but express no opinion on the appellate process. We would venture a guess that most opinion recipients assume that if the bankruptcy court gets it wrong, their rights will be vindicated on appeal. The Eighth Circuit opinion in Opportunity Finance1 casts a troubling shadow over that assumption.
Background