On November 25, a notice of proposed rulemaking was published jointly by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the FDIC) and the Departmental Offices of the Department of the Treasury (the Treasury, and collectively, the Agencies) to implement applicable provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act). In accordance with the requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act, the proposed rules govern the calculation of the maximum obligation limitation (MOL), as specified in section 210(n)(6) of the Dodd-Frank Act.
On October 28, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued an opinion in the Chapter 15 case of Qimonda AG (“Qimonda”).1 The bankruptcy court held that the application of § 365(n) to executory licenses to U.S. patents was required to sufficiently protect the interests of U.S. patent licensees under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code and that the failure of German insolvency law to protect patent licensees was “manifestly contrary” to United States public policy.
Rejection of a contract in bankruptcy may not always accomplish a debtor’s goal to shed ongoing contractual obligations and liabilities, especially when dealing with employee benefit plans. On October 13, 2011, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals highlighted this issue in its opinion in Evans v. Sterling Chemicals, Inc.1 regarding the treatment of a pre-bankruptcy asset purchase agreement which contained a provision addressing the debtor-acquiror’s post-closing ERISA retiree benefit plan obligations to its new employees resulting from the transaction.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the Court), has held that section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits a swap counterparty from setting off amounts owed to the debtor against amounts owed by the debtor to affiliates of the counterparty, notwithstanding the safe harbor provision in section 561 of the Bankruptcy Code and language in the ISDA Master Agreement permitting the swap counterparty to effect “triangular” setoffs. In re Lehman Brothers Inc., Case No. 08-01420 (JMP)(SIPA) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. October 4, 2011).
In re Zais Investment Grade Ltd. VII1 is the latest in a recent line of bankruptcy cases challenging bedrock assumptions regarding securitization special purpose entities (SPEs) and bankruptcy considerations in securitization transactions.2 Zais establishes precedent allowing a senior noteholder of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) to place the CDO issuer in an involuntary chapter 11 bankruptcy in order to advance an asset management plan that would otherwise require supermajority approval of all noteholders (including all junior classes) under the related indenture.
The scenario has become all too familiar in recent years: a borrower defaults on a loan and, when the lender pursues the loan collateral through foreclosure or other proceedings, the borrower files for bankruptcy protection. More often than not, when the lender appears in bankruptcy court to pursue its interest in the collateral, the borrower counterattacks with a host of state law lender liability claims.
The Supreme Court of Delaware recently held that creditors of insolvent Delaware limited liability companies (LLCs) lack standing to bring derivative suits on behalf of the LLCs.
In March 2010, CML V brought both derivative and direct claims against the present and former managers of JetDirect Aviation Holdings LLC in the Court of Chancery after JetDirect defaulted on its loan obligations to CML. The Vice Chancellor dismissed all the claims, finding that, as a creditor, CML lacked standing to bring derivative claims on behalf of JetDirect, and CML appealed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found in favor of the trustee (the Trustee) presiding over the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (BMIS), affirming the Trustee’s calculation of “net equity” in the BMIS liquidation. The Trustee calculates net equity to determine the value of claims submitted by victims of Madoff’s massive fraud.
Bankruptcy Judge Michael Lynn of the Northern District of Texas recently issued a noteworthy opinion in In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. that addresses two important Chapter 11 confirmation issues. Judge Lynn determined that a plan that artificially impaired a class of claims in order to meet the requirements of section 1129(a)(10) had not been proposed in bad faith and did not violate the requirements of section 1129(a). In his ruling, Judge Lynn also applied the Supreme Court’s cram-down “interest”1 rate teachings in Till v.
As many creditors have unfortunately discovered, the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to sue the creditor for certain payments – called preferences – that the creditor received from the debtor prior to the bankruptcy.