Last week the Supreme Court exercised its option to do nothing about a Seventh Circuit decision allowing the federal government to cram a $150 million remediation obligation onto a chapter 11 successor corporation – all because the feds chose to proceed under RCRA (the federal hazardous waste statute) rather than CERCLA (the Superfund cleanup statute). Smart tactics by the feds.

In re Leslie Controls, Inc., No. 10-12199 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 21, 2010), involved a very common scenario. A company in financial difficulty sought to negotiate a consensual restructuring with an ad hoc committee and, in that context, disclosed various confidential analyses. In this particular case, the company had asbestos exposure, the ad hoc committee represented asbestos plaintiffs, and the shared information included a memorandum and numerous e-mails concerning potential insurance recoveries under various bankruptcy scenarios.

On July 13, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held, in a landmark decision, that a plan sponsor which had the right to unilaterally terminate retiree benefits outside of bankruptcy could not exercise that same right during a bankruptcy proceeding. The case, IUE-CWA v. Visteon Corp. (In re Visteon Corp.), marks the first time that a Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against a bankrupt employer in its attempt to unilaterally terminate non-vested retiree welfare benefits.

Intercreditor agreements between first and second lien lenders are created all the time and are therefore not usually glitzy topics for client updates. But the recent intercreditor dispute between Donald Trump and corporate raider Carl Icahn over control of Trump's Atlantic City casinos had all the drama and glamour of the gambling dens and billionaires involved, including two competing but confirmable plans and senior and junior creditors vying for ownership of a gaming empire and its attendant upside.

Many landlords are very familiar with provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code dealing with assumption and rejection of leases. However, the particular consequences of lease rejection may not be as well known. For example, once a lease is rejected or deemed to be rejected, a landlord may not know its rights with respect to regaining possession of the leased premises. A recent case from a Florida bankruptcy court shed some light on this issue when it held that after a debtor has rejected a lease, the tenant must surrender the premises to the landlord.

On May 20, 2010 the Senate passed the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 (the "Senate Bill") 59-39, only hours after the cloture vote ended debate on the bill. The House passed its version—the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009 (the "House Bill")—in December 2009. The primary stated focus of the Senate and House Bills is to prevent the failure of the "too big to fail" institutions and to avoid government (taxpayer) bailouts in the future.

In a Bracewell & Giuliani client alert dated December 7, 2009 (which can be found here), we reported on a decision ("WaMu I") from Judge Walrath of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court that required a group of bondholders of Washington Mutual, Inc. ("WMI") to comply fully with the disclosure requirements of Bankruptcy Rule 2019.

We have been sending Client Updates since 2007 concerning the decision of the Australian High (Supreme) Court in Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic. Specifically, the High Court held that the damages claims of shareholders of insolvent companies for fraud and misrepresentation should be treated pari passu with the claims of all other unsecured creditors, rather than being treated as subordinated to unsecured claims as is the case in the U.S.

Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has just issued an opinion that should concern anyone doing business with a debtor in bankruptcy. In short, the court ruled that a company that supplied $1.9 million worth of goods to a debtor after the petition date had to return the debtor's payment. The reason? The debtor did not have permission from the court or its secured creditor to use the money. The payments were for value given post-petition and were apparently made in accordance with the pre-petition practice between the parties.