Last week the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved debtor-American Airlines’ motion to enter into a secured financing transaction and repay certain pre-petition aircraft financing without paying make-whole premiums. The indenture trustee sought to ground the motion by asserting that the make-whole had to be paid, but it was the indenture trustee, not American, that crashed and burned.

When a debtor rejects an executory contract, Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a licensee of intellectual property to retain certain rights under the rejected contract. An important question arises, therefore, whether a particular agreement indeed involves a license. In a recent decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has reaffirmed the definition of a license as “a mere waiver of the right to sue by the patentee.” In re Spansion, Inc., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26131, *7 (3d Cir. Dec. 21, 2012) (citing De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. v.

This is a follow up to our recent blog post discussing then pending Michigan legislation known as the “Local Financial Stability and Choice Act” or Public Act 436 (the “Financial Stability Act”), which will replace Public Act 72 and overhaul Michigan’s emergency manager law.  On December 27, 2012, Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder signed the Financial Stability Act into law.

With an increasing number of businesses operating without regard to borders in today’s global economy, the importance of understanding Chapter 15 — the Bankruptcy Code provisions instructing the cooperation between the United States and courts of foreign lands involved in cross-border insolvency cases — has never been greater. This advisory will touch on the scope of Chapter 15 and its attempt to balance comity and domestic legal policy, as highlighted in the recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Ad Hoc Group of Vitro Noteholders v. Vitro SAB de CV, No.

Detroit’s increasingly distressed financial condition has created a dynamic and rapidly evolving situation where the potential of a Chapter 9 filing appears to be the subject of renewed discussion and legislative attention.  In particular, state legislation providing Detroit a menu of options for addressing its finances appears headed to enactment this month.  Although such legislation includes one option expressly protective of debt service payments on Detroit’s public debt, several of the options may lead to a Chapter 9 filing as a first or last resort. 

Last week, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas granted involuntary bankruptcy petitions against ten US subsidiaries of Mexican glassmaker Vitro S.A.B. de C.V. (the “New Debtor Subsidiaries” and “Vitro”, respectively). The ruling is a win in the multi-paned litigation involving certain petitioning noteholders (the “Noteholders”) in their fight against Vitro’s efforts to effect a non-consensual restructuring of their debt through a Mexican insolvency proceeding.

Electric vehicle battery manufacturer A123, which received a $249 million stimulus grant from the Department of Energy, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection October 15 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware to facilitate an agreement in which Johnson Controls will purchase its automotive business assets for $125 million. The company has drawn down roughly $131 million of its grant, and has faced problems with batteries supplied to Fisker as well as low demand for electric vehicles.

A third court confirms that settlement payments are still settlement payments and early redemptions of notes prior to maturity are exempted from preference actions.

Yesterday (September 12, 2012) the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas provided an excellent lesson on the need to know what sauce is going into the stew that governs privileged communications in bankruptcy proceedings.[1]

In the case of In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California heard arguments on September 4, 2012, as to whether the alleged debtor, a tribal casino, was eligible for bankruptcy protection. The court concluded the casino was not an eligible debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.