The trading rules and conventions of the loan market are well known to its participants. Similarly, the laws and practices governing equity securities trading in the U.S. are quite familiar to securities market professionals. The opportunity for confusion may arise, however, when these two markets quickly converge—for example, when the loans of a reorganized borrower are converted into or satisfied by the issuance of equity securities.

Does this sound familiar? A newly formed entity purchases distressed bank debt after the debtor has proposed a reorganization plan. The purchaser obtains a blocking position and uses its negotiating leverage to obtain control of the plan process and ultimately the borrower’s assets, which have strategic importance to the purchaser.

On December 21, ISDA announced that it sought and was granted permission to intervene in the Lehman Brothers International Europe case in order to ensure that the arguments reflecting the market's interpretation of Section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement were made before the court. The court agreed with ISDA that Section 2(a)(iii) is "suspensive" in effect. ISDA Release.

On December 29, 2010, the Honorable Mariana R. Pfaelzer denied a motion by Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP ("Plaintiff") to remand its claims against Countrywide and others to state court. Judge Pfaelzer concluded that the case was sufficiently related to a bankruptcy case to confer federal jurisdiction in light of contractual indemnification obligations of a bankrupt originator, American Home Mortgage Corp., to Countrywide. The Court also concluded that there were no equitable grounds meriting remand.

On November 17th, Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. ("LBSF") and its official unsecured creditors' committee filed a joint motion to stay BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited's ("BNY") appeal for 90 days in the "Dante" matter, pending final settlement of the dispute between LBSF and Perpetual Trustee Company Limited ("Perpetual").

Years ago, second lien lenders adhered to the truism about children -- they were seen but not heard. As our children have grown more vocal in recent years, so too have second lien lenders. A spate of recent bankruptcy cases demonstrate that second lien lenders have been both seen and heard at many critical junctures in the chapter 11 timeline -- at the sale of the debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code,1 in seeking the appointment of an examiner,2 when voting on a chapter 11 plan,3 and in connection with the confirmation hearing.4

The rapid evolution of a robust secondary market for claims against the three largest failed Icelandic banks provides a powerful example of the prompt adaptation of an existing secondary-market legal framework -- originally developed in the US and Europe -- to a complex and novel bankruptcy regime and trading environment.

In the jargon of the secondary bank loan market, loans beneficially owned by participation may be "elevated" to direct assignments once requisite administrative agent and/or borrower consent is obtained. Such "elevations" customarily have been viewed as straightforward transactions -- when completed, the participant simply stands in the shoes of the grantor and becomes the lender of record of the loan on the books of the administrative agent.

On October 12, the FDIC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking for a rule clarifying how the FDIC would treat certain creditor claims under the new liquidation authority, established under the Dodd-Frank Act, for financial companies whose insolvency would pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the United States.

In the wake of the recent financial crisis, the legal system continues to sort out rights and obligations of financial market participants. This is especially true for participants in the over-the-counter derivatives markets.

The tremendous growth of that largely unregulated market has been accompanied by the development of sophisticated contractual frameworks and specific bankruptcy legislation expressly intended to reduce uncertainty around the amount and type of claims that could ultimately be asserted by market participants following bankruptcy of a derivative counterparty.