Manley Toys Limited once claimed to be the seventh largest toy company in the world. Due to ongoing litigation and declining sales, it entered into a voluntary liquidation in Hong Kong. On March 22, 2016, the debtor’s appointed liquidators and foreign representatives filed a motion for recognition under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. The motion was opposed by ASI Inc., f/k/a Aviva Sports, Inc. (“Aviva”) and Toys “R” Us, Inc. (“TRU”).
U.S. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 provides that on a motion brought by a trustee (and thus a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession as well) the court may approve a settlement. The prevailing view is that due to the court’s approval requirement, pre-court approval settlement agreements are enforceable by the debtor but not against the debtor. The District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently disagreed. It held that the statutory approval requirement is not an opportunity for the debtor to repudiate the settlement.
Directors and officers (D&Os) of troubled companies should be highly sensitive to D&O insurance policies with Prior Act Exclusion. While policies with such exclusion may be cheaper, a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Eleventh Circuit raises the spectre that a court may hold a loss to have more than a coincidental causal connection with the officer’s conduct pre-policy period and make the (cheaper) coverage worthless.
A U.S. House of Representatives Bill would amend the Bankruptcy Code to establish new provisions to address the special issues raised by troubled nonbank financial institutions.
In a 2-1 opinion, the Second Circuit overruled the district court in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp., finding no violation of the Trust Indenture Act (“TIA”) in connection with an out-of-court debt restructuring.
Background
Addressing a novel issue in In re: International Oil Trading Company, LLC, 548 B.R. 825 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2016), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently denied in part an involuntary debtor’s motion to compel production of communications between the judgment creditor who had filed the involuntary bankruptcy petition and the petitioner’s litigation funder. The Court found that the attorney-client privilege and work product protection were applicable to certain disclosures made to the litigation funder, a non-lawyer third-party.
Before soliciting votes on its bankruptcy plan, a chapter 11 debtor that has filed for bankruptcy typically must obtain court approval of its disclosure statement. As part of the disclosure-statement approval process, interested parties are afforded the opportunity to object. For example, a party may object on the grounds that the disclosure statement lacks sufficient information about the debtor. Sometimes, however, a party objects to the disclosure statement because the chapter 11 plan described by the statement cannot be confirmed.
The ability of a bankruptcy court to reorder the priority of claims or interests by means of equitable subordination or recharacterization of debt as equity is generally recognized. Even so, the Bankruptcy Code itself expressly authorizes only the former of these two remedies. Although common law uniformly acknowledges the power of a court to recast a claim asserted by a creditor as an equity interest in an appropriate case, the Bankruptcy Code is silent upon the availability of the remedy in a bankruptcy case.
In Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the estate of Vickie Lynn Marshall, a.k.a. Anna Nicole Smith, lost by a 5-4 margin Round 2 of its Supreme Court bout with the estate of E. Pierce Marshall in a contest over Vickie's rights to a portion of the fortune of her late husband, billionaire J. Howard Marshall II. The dollar figures in dispute, amounting to more than $400 million, and the celebrity status of the original (and now deceased) litigants may grab headlines.
Over the past five years, courts have issued rulings of potential concern to buyers of distressed debt. Courts have addressed, among other things, “loan to own” acquisition strategies resulting in vote designation; equitable subordination, disallowance, and other lender liability exposure based upon the claim seller’s misconduct; disclosure requirements for ad hoc committees of debtholders; the adequacy of standardized claims-trading agreements; and claim-filing requirements in the era of computerized records.