Prior to March 2017, any right to sue that comprised an asset of a bankrupt’s estate could only be litigated by the trustee of the bankrupt. The inability of a trustee to assign a bankrupt’s cause of action resulted in many such actions not being litigated due to factors such as a lack of resources. This position changed through the insertion into the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) in Schedule 2 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Bankruptcy), which expressly permits a trustee to assign to a third party any right to sue that is held by of a bankrupt estate (see section 100-5).
The Limitations Act 1969 (NSW) (Limitations Act) establishes time limits within which plaintiffs must commence civil proceedings, including for the recovery of a debt. A failure to bring a claim within the relevant time period results in the claim lapsing, and the creditor losing its rights to enforce its debt. Accordingly, it is critical that creditors understand how the law restricts their ability to collect debts and any exceptions that they may rely upon as the limitation date approaches.
The statutory demand is a formidable card up a creditor’s sleeve that can result in a company being deemed to be insolvent if it does not pay the creditor’s debt within 21 days of service of the demand. Whether a statutory demand served on an incorporated body other than an Australian company will be effective largely depends on the State or Territory in which the incorporated body is based and whether it is served pursuant to the correct section of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act).
What is a statutory demand?
Two United States Bankruptcy Judges for the Southern District of New York recently issued a joint opinion addressing common issues raised by motions to dismiss in two separate adversary proceedings – one pending before Judge Bernstein and the other before Judge Glenn (the “Adversary Proceedings”). The Adversary Proceedings were filed by the debtors in two chapter 11 cases, each involving an Anguillan offshore bank – National Bank of Anguilla (Private Banking Trust) Ltd. and Caribbean Commercial Investment Bank Ltd. (the “Debtor Banks”).
Manley Toys Limited once claimed to be the seventh largest toy company in the world. Due to ongoing litigation and declining sales, it entered into a voluntary liquidation in Hong Kong. On March 22, 2016, the debtor’s appointed liquidators and foreign representatives filed a motion for recognition under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. The motion was opposed by ASI Inc., f/k/a Aviva Sports, Inc. (“Aviva”) and Toys “R” Us, Inc. (“TRU”).
U.S. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 provides that on a motion brought by a trustee (and thus a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession as well) the court may approve a settlement. The prevailing view is that due to the court’s approval requirement, pre-court approval settlement agreements are enforceable by the debtor but not against the debtor. The District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently disagreed. It held that the statutory approval requirement is not an opportunity for the debtor to repudiate the settlement.
Directors and officers (D&Os) of troubled companies should be highly sensitive to D&O insurance policies with Prior Act Exclusion. While policies with such exclusion may be cheaper, a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Eleventh Circuit raises the spectre that a court may hold a loss to have more than a coincidental causal connection with the officer’s conduct pre-policy period and make the (cheaper) coverage worthless.
A U.S. House of Representatives Bill would amend the Bankruptcy Code to establish new provisions to address the special issues raised by troubled nonbank financial institutions.
In a 2-1 opinion, the Second Circuit overruled the district court in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp., finding no violation of the Trust Indenture Act (“TIA”) in connection with an out-of-court debt restructuring.
Background
Addressing a novel issue in In re: International Oil Trading Company, LLC, 548 B.R. 825 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2016), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently denied in part an involuntary debtor’s motion to compel production of communications between the judgment creditor who had filed the involuntary bankruptcy petition and the petitioner’s litigation funder. The Court found that the attorney-client privilege and work product protection were applicable to certain disclosures made to the litigation funder, a non-lawyer third-party.