Manley Toys Limited once claimed to be the seventh largest toy company in the world. Due to ongoing litigation and declining sales, it entered into a voluntary liquidation in Hong Kong. On March 22, 2016, the debtor’s appointed liquidators and foreign representatives filed a motion for recognition under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. The motion was opposed by ASI Inc., f/k/a Aviva Sports, Inc. (“Aviva”) and Toys “R” Us, Inc. (“TRU”).
U.S. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 provides that on a motion brought by a trustee (and thus a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession as well) the court may approve a settlement. The prevailing view is that due to the court’s approval requirement, pre-court approval settlement agreements are enforceable by the debtor but not against the debtor. The District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently disagreed. It held that the statutory approval requirement is not an opportunity for the debtor to repudiate the settlement.
Directors and officers (D&Os) of troubled companies should be highly sensitive to D&O insurance policies with Prior Act Exclusion. While policies with such exclusion may be cheaper, a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Eleventh Circuit raises the spectre that a court may hold a loss to have more than a coincidental causal connection with the officer’s conduct pre-policy period and make the (cheaper) coverage worthless.
A U.S. House of Representatives Bill would amend the Bankruptcy Code to establish new provisions to address the special issues raised by troubled nonbank financial institutions.
In a 2-1 opinion, the Second Circuit overruled the district court in Marblegate Asset Management LLC v. Education Management Corp., finding no violation of the Trust Indenture Act (“TIA”) in connection with an out-of-court debt restructuring.
Background
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently held that a confirmable Chapter 13 plan cannot both “vest” title to real property and “surrender” that property to a secured lender, and that the secured lender may refuse to accept the vesting in satisfaction of its claim.
Thus, the Court held that a debtor may not force the transfer of title in collateral to a secured creditor in satisfaction of the secured creditor’s claim, without the consent of the secured creditor.
Addressing a novel issue in In re: International Oil Trading Company, LLC, 548 B.R. 825 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2016), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently denied in part an involuntary debtor’s motion to compel production of communications between the judgment creditor who had filed the involuntary bankruptcy petition and the petitioner’s litigation funder. The Court found that the attorney-client privilege and work product protection were applicable to certain disclosures made to the litigation funder, a non-lawyer third-party.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of a borrower’s lawsuit against a bank, holding that the district court correctly found that sale orders entered in a prior bankruptcy case were res judicata and precluded the borrower’s new claims.
A copy of the opinion is available at: Link to Opinion.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that a bankruptcy court clearly erred in its finding that a debtor proposed a Chapter 11 plan in good faith, when the secured mortgagee would be paid only in part and very slowly after 10 years with no obligation by the debtor to maintain the building and obtain insurance, while a second class would be paid in full in two payments of $1,200 each over 60 days.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently denied a mortgagee’s motion to reopen a Chapter 7 case to compel the surrender of real property, due to a five-year delay in filing the motion.
In so ruling, the court agreed with an earlier ruling from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida (In re Plummer, 513 B.R. 135 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2014)), distinguishing “surrender” from “foreclosure,” and holding that a creditor cannot use the Bankruptcy Code to circumvent the obligations imposed by state law.