In two recent decisions, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has interpreted narrowly certain of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.  

On February 16, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a discounted cash flow analysis constituted “a commercially reasonable determinant[] of value” for purposes of section 562(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.1 In so doing, the court upheld the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware decision sustaining the objection of American Home Mortgage Holdings, Inc.

United States District Court Judge Alan S. Gold, on February 11, 2011, reversed a Florida bankruptcy court’s controversial October 2009 fraudulent transfer judgment1 against a group of lenders based on their receipt of a $421 million loan repayment in July 2007. 3V Capital Master Fund, et al., v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Tousa, Inc., et al, Case No. 10-60017-CIV (S.D. Fla. Feb.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently considered the enforceability of claims for "make-whole" amounts and damages for breach of a "no-call" provision. In re Chemtura Corp., No. 09-11233 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2010) ("Chemtura"). These provisions are generally enforceable outside of bankruptcy, but enforceability in the context of a bankruptcy case is still unclear. In Chemtura, the court did not actually rule on enforceability but approved a settlement that allocated value to creditors on account of a make-whole clause and a no-call provision.

The current cycle of Chapter 11 corporate bankruptcies involves many cases where the debtor seeks to achieve a balance-sheet restructuring by converting debt into equity. When consensus cannot be achieved, junior stakeholders (i.e., second lien creditors, unsecured creditors and/or equity) will often contest plan confirmation on the grounds that the proposed plan provides more than 100% recovery to the senior creditors. Valuation plays the central role in these cases.

A New York bankruptcy judge held on October 4, 2010, that second lien lenders could object to a debtor’s bid procedures approved by the first lien lenders despite the terms of an intercreditor agreement inIn re Boston Generating, LLC, No. 10-14419 (SCC) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2010).1 The intercreditor agreement provided the first lien lenders with the “exclusive right to…make determinations regarding the…sale” of the collateral. According to the court, however, the agreement did not expressly preclude the second lien lenders from objecting to bid procedures.

On September 21, 2010, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited leave to appeal a decision of the Bankruptcy Court in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy case.1 The Bankruptcy Court held that a key provision of certain transaction documents constituted an unenforceable ipso facto clause. The District Court granted leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court decision even though it was interlocutory.

Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“WSRCPA”) represents Congress’ attempt to address companies considered “too big to fail.” The statute creates a new “orderly liquidation authority” (“OLA”), which allows the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) to seize control of a financial company1 whose imminent collapse is determined to threaten the financial system as a whole. Commencement of a receivership under the OLA would preempt any proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code.

The comprehensive financial reform bill recently passed by the Senate1 creates a new “orderly liquidation authority” (“OLA”) that would allow the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) to seize control of a financial company2 whose imminent collapse is determined to threaten the financial system as a whole.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a Bankruptcy Court decision that invalidated the use by creditors of so-called “triangular”, or non-mutual, setoffs in which obligations are offset among not only the parties to a bilateral contract but also their affiliates. In re SemCrude, L.P., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42477 (D. Del.