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On May 4, 2012 Judge Kevin J. Carey of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that a claim against a debtor’s estate, transferred to a third party, is subject to the same infirmities as in the hands of the original holder of the claim.  In re KB Toys, Inc., — B.R. —-, 2012 WL 1570755, at *11 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012).  Judge Carey’s opinion diverged from, and criticized, the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs., L.L.C., 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, on May 15, 2012, reversed a district court's February 2011 decision that lenders were not liable on a fraudulent transfer claim. In re TOUSA, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9796 (11th Cir. 5/15/12).[1] It rejected the district court's finding that corporate subsidiaries had received "reasonably equivalent value" when they encumbered their assets to secure a loan made to them and their corporate parent.

On March 26, 2012, Judge Mary F. Walrath of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware refused to rule that, as a matter of law, payments made to satisfy a debtor’s obligations under a letter of credit constitute “settlement payments” protected from avoidance under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. EPLG I, LLC v. Citibank, National Association et al. (In re Qimonda Richmond, LLC, et al.), No. 09-10589, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1264 (Bankr.

The United States Supreme Court recently submitted to Congress an amendment to Bankruptcy Rule 2019 dealing with disclosure by groups of hedge funds and other distressed investors in reorganization cases. Unless Congress blocks its passage, which is unlikely, the amendment will become effective on Dec. 1, 2011.1 As shown below, the new rule streamlines and clarifies what had become a frequently litigated disclosure process.

Background

On February 16, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a discounted cash flow analysis constituted “a commercially reasonable determinant[] of value” for purposes of section 562(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.1 In so doing, the court upheld the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware decision sustaining the objection of American Home Mortgage Holdings, Inc.

United States District Court Judge Alan S. Gold, on February 11, 2011, reversed a Florida bankruptcy court’s controversial October 2009 fraudulent transfer judgment1 against a group of lenders based on their receipt of a $421 million loan repayment in July 2007. 3V Capital Master Fund, et al., v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Tousa, Inc., et al, Case No. 10-60017-CIV (S.D. Fla. Feb.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently considered the enforceability of claims for "make-whole" amounts and damages for breach of a "no-call" provision. In re Chemtura Corp., No. 09-11233 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2010) ("Chemtura"). These provisions are generally enforceable outside of bankruptcy, but enforceability in the context of a bankruptcy case is still unclear. In Chemtura, the court did not actually rule on enforceability but approved a settlement that allocated value to creditors on account of a make-whole clause and a no-call provision.

The current cycle of Chapter 11 corporate bankruptcies involves many cases where the debtor seeks to achieve a balance-sheet restructuring by converting debt into equity. When consensus cannot be achieved, junior stakeholders (i.e., second lien creditors, unsecured creditors and/or equity) will often contest plan confirmation on the grounds that the proposed plan provides more than 100% recovery to the senior creditors. Valuation plays the central role in these cases.

A New York bankruptcy judge held on October 4, 2010, that second lien lenders could object to a debtor’s bid procedures approved by the first lien lenders despite the terms of an intercreditor agreement inIn re Boston Generating, LLC, No. 10-14419 (SCC) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2010).1 The intercreditor agreement provided the first lien lenders with the “exclusive right to…make determinations regarding the…sale” of the collateral. According to the court, however, the agreement did not expressly preclude the second lien lenders from objecting to bid procedures.