Die weltweite Ausbreitung des Coronavirus sorgt für heftige Turbulenzen im Wirtschaftsleben. Gerät eine GmbH in finanzielle Schieflage, steht besonders die Geschäftsführung unter Druck. Sie kämpft um das wirtschaftliche Überleben der Gesellschaft. Gleichzeitig kommen verschiedene Szenarien für die Haftung des Geschäftsführers in Betracht, wenn dieser keine Krisenprävention durchgeführt hat oder in der Krise nicht die erforderliche Sorgfalt anwendet.

Haftung wegen unzureichender Krisenprävention

The coronavirus pandemic is sending shock waves through the business world. If a GmbH (German limited liability company) finds itself in financial distress, the management in particular will be under pressure and must fight for the survival of the business. At the same time, there are various scenarios in which managing directors could be held liable for not implementing crisis prevention measures or exercising the necessary diligence during the crisis.

Liability for inadequate crisis prevention

Affirming the bankruptcy court below in a case of first impression, in In re Caviata Attached Homes, LLC, 481 B.R. 34 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012), a Ninth Circuit bankruptcy appellate panel held that a relapse into economic recession following a chapter 11 debtor’s emergence from bankruptcy was not an “extraordinary circumstance” that would justify the filing of a new chapter 11 case for the purpose of modifying the debtor’s previously confirmed plan of reorganization.

Modification of a Confirmed Chapter 11 Plan

In the first circuit-level opinion on the issue, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Matson v. Alarcon, 651 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2011), held that, for purposes of establishing priority under section 507(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, an employee's severance pay was "earned" entirely upon termination of employment, even though the severance amount was determined by the employee's length of service with the employer.

Section 507(a)(4)

The Bankruptcy Code treats insiders with increased scrutiny, from longer preference periods to rigorous equitable subordination principles, denial of chapter 7 trustee voting rights, disqualification in some cases of votes on a cram-down chapter 11 plan, and restrictions on postpetition key-employee compensation packages. The treatment of claims by insiders for prebankruptcy services is no exception to this general policy: section 502(b)(4) disallows insider claims for services to the extent the claim exceeds the "reasonable value" of such services.