The Hong Kong Court of Appeal has finally laid to rest the vexed issue of whether an arbitration agreement or a winding-up petition should take precedence in an insolvency situation. In two parallel decisions, the Court of Appeal ruled that an arbitration agreement should be treated in the same way as an exclusive jurisdiction clause and that the principle should be given a wide interpretation.
The Singapore High Court has again confirmed that a winding-up application concerning a disputed debt that is subject to an arbitration agreement will be dismissed if the arbitration agreement is prima facie valid and covers the dispute. This prima facie standard of review was first formulated three years ago by the Singapore Court of Appeal in AnAn Group (Singapore) Pte Ltd v VTB Bank (Public Joint Stock Company) [2020] SCGA 33.
Three recent Hong Kong first instance court decisions have left undecided the question of whether a winding-up petition will trump an agreement to arbitrate when it comes to a winding-up and particularly in the context of cross-claims. A Court of Final Appeal decision this spring had seemed to provide pointers that the parties' agreement would be upheld but the issue – particularly when it comes to unmeritorious and late arbitration applications – is dividing the courts.
A Hong Kong court has stayed a petition presented on the just and equitable ground to arbitration, on the basis of arbitration agreements found within what the petitioner described as quasi-partnership agreements formed in 2007. The court also dismissed claims that the appointed arbitrator lacked the requisite qualifications and experience, and that a stay would lead to further costs and duplication of resources.
In several Commonwealth jurisdictions, the corporate legislation allows creditors to petition a court to order the winding up of a debtor in circumstances where that debtor is unable to pay its debts as they fall due. Such legislation generally presumes that the debtor is insolvent if it has failed to comply with a statutory notice requiring the debtor to pay a certain debt within a given period of time (a statutory demand).
The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic will leave in its wake a significant increase in commercial chapter 11 filings. Many of these cases will feature extensive litigation involving breach of contract claims, business interruption insurance disputes, and common law causes of action based on novel interpretations of long-standing legal doctrines such as force majeure.
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali recently ruled in the Chapter 11 case of Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ability of a bankrupt power utility company to reject power purchase agreements (“PPAs”).
The Supreme Court this week resolved a long-standing open issue regarding the treatment of trademark license rights in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court ruled in favor of Mission Products, a licensee under a trademark license agreement that had been rejected in the chapter 11 case of Tempnology, the debtor-licensor, determining that the rejection constituted a breach of the agreement but did not rescind it.
Few issues in bankruptcy create as much contention as disputes regarding the right of setoff. This was recently highlighted by a decision in the chapter 11 case of Orexigen Therapeutics in the District of Delaware.
The judicial power of the United States is vested in courts created under Article III of the Constitution. However, Congress created the current bankruptcy court system over 40 years ago pursuant to Article I of the Constitution rather than under Article III.