German insolvency law is governed by a comprehensive Insolvency Code which entered into force on January 1, 1999 and has been amended from time to time, the last major reform being the Act for the Further Facilitation of the Restructuring of Companies (ESUG) which largely came into force as of 1 March 2012. There is only one primary uniform insolvency procedure which applies to both individuals and companies. In the following, we focus on companies.

Chapter 11 creditors' committees and debtors continue to challenge lenders' prepayment premiums, commitment fees and post-bankruptcy interest claims in reorganization cases. Nevertheless, courts regularly reject these challenges in well-reasoned decisions. This Alert focuses on two of these recent decisions:In re Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 2012 WL 2017952 (9th Cir.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, on May 15, 2012, reversed a district court's February 2011 decision that lenders were not liable on a fraudulent transfer claim. In re TOUSA, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9796 (11th Cir. 5/15/12).^[1] It rejected the district court's finding that corporate subsidiaries had received "reasonably equivalent value" when they encumbered their assets to secure a loan made to them and their corporate parent.

Introduction

Hildyard J’s recent sanctioning of the scheme of arrangement proposed by PrimaCom Holding GmbH (‘’PrimaCom’’), a German incorporated company whose creditors were domiciled outside of the UK, has reaffirmed the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the English courts in respect of schemes of arrangement and confirmed their status as a useful instrument for foreign companies looking to restructure¹.  

The process

On December 13, 2011, the Act for the Further Facilitation of the Restructuring of Companies (ESUG), whose material provisions will come into force on March 1, 2012, was announced in the Federal Gazette. The ESUG bundles several reformatory efforts with regard to German insolvency law and will likely have significant effects on the daily practice. Generally, the restructuring of companies in financial crisis will be made easier. The creditors’ influence on the proceedings, including the selection of the person of the insolvency administrator, is increased.

The United States Supreme Court recently submitted to Congress an amendment to Bankruptcy Rule 2019 dealing with disclosure by groups of hedge funds and other distressed investors in reorganization cases. Unless Congress blocks its passage, which is unlikely, the amendment will become effective on Dec. 1, 2011.1 As shown below, the new rule streamlines and clarifies what had become a frequently litigated disclosure process.

Background

United States District Court Judge Alan S. Gold, on February 11, 2011, reversed a Florida bankruptcy court’s controversial October 2009 fraudulent transfer judgment1 against a group of lenders based on their receipt of a $421 million loan repayment in July 2007. 3V Capital Master Fund, et al., v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Tousa, Inc., et al, Case No. 10-60017-CIV (S.D. Fla. Feb.

The EU Decision

The EU Commission has held on January 26, 2011 that the so called restructuring privilege offered by German corporate tax law, which allows corporations in a distressed financial situation to continue to set off tax loss carry forwards against future profits even if their shareholder structure has substantially changed, is incompatible with EU State Aid provisions.

The recipients, which have applied the restructuring privilege, are now threatened with the reclaim of the tax benefits.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently considered the enforceability of claims for "make-whole" amounts and damages for breach of a "no-call" provision. In re Chemtura Corp., No. 09-11233 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2010) ("Chemtura"). These provisions are generally enforceable outside of bankruptcy, but enforceability in the context of a bankruptcy case is still unclear. In Chemtura, the court did not actually rule on enforceability but approved a settlement that allocated value to creditors on account of a make-whole clause and a no-call provision.

The current cycle of Chapter 11 corporate bankruptcies involves many cases where the debtor seeks to achieve a balance-sheet restructuring by converting debt into equity. When consensus cannot be achieved, junior stakeholders (i.e., second lien creditors, unsecured creditors and/or equity) will often contest plan confirmation on the grounds that the proposed plan provides more than 100% recovery to the senior creditors. Valuation plays the central role in these cases.