Release provisions

The scope of the powers afforded to the security agent by the so called “release provisions” found in many intercreditor agreements employed in LBO deals has come under scrutiny recently. A number of restructurings have relied upon using the security agent’s powers to implement a restructuring and many others will have at least considered using them.

Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes a new non-judicial receivership al-ternative for resolving troubled financial companies that could threaten the stability of the U.S. financial system (“Covered Financial Companies”), as described further below. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), on October 12, 2010, issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (the “Proposal”) to begin to implement the provisions of Title II.

The next few years will see the “redevelopment” of the law in two critical areas involving bank failures where the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-tion (“FDIC”) is appointed receiver: (i) the relative rights and claims of creditors of a bank or savings and loan holding company, including the FDIC; and (ii) D&O and professional liability. Significant decisions are be-ginning to be issued with regard to the former.

The Court of Appeal1 has ruled that foreign judgments in insolvency proceedings may be enforced by the English courts at common law, and that the ordinary principles which may prevent the enforcement of foreign judgments do not apply to insolvency judgments where the action from which the foreign judgment arises is integral to the collective nature of the insolvency proceedings.

Facts

Arbitration proceedings in England are creatures of contract, arising out of the agreement between the parties to refer their disputes to arbitration. However, except in limited circumstances, when one of the parties to an arbitration agreement becomes insolvent, England’s statutory insolvency regime takes precedence over the rules of the arbitration.

The Insolvency Regime in England and Wales

In a recent case1, the High Court concluded that it was right to sanction schemes of arrangement which formed part of a wider debt restructuring that excluded out-of-the-money junior creditors. In doing so, it valued the distressed companies on a going concern basis.

Background