In a decision further defining when US public policy restricts the relief a court may grant in aid of a foreign restructuring or insolvency proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court in the Chapter 15 case of Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. v. ACP Master, Ltd. (In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V.), Ch. 15 Case No. 11-33335-HDH-15, 2012 WL 2138112 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jun. 13, 2012) refused to a enforce a Mexican restructuring plan that novated and extinguished the guaranty obligations of the Mexican debtor’s non-debtor subsidiary guarantors.

Whether a secured creditor has an absolute right to credit bid at a sale under a chapter 11 plan has been the subject of conflicting decisions rendered by the Third, Fifth and Seventh Circuits.¹ The United States Supreme Court has resolved these inconsistent rulings with its decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, et al., v. Amalgamated Bank, ² which affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s holding that a secured creditor has an absolute right to credit bid in a sale under a chapter 11 plan.

Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code creates a worldwide estate comprising all of the legal or equitable interests of the debtor, “wherever located,” held by the debtor as of the filing date.¹ The Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay, in turn, applies “to all entities” and protects the debtor’s property and the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction by barring “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate . . .

On September 2, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a holding by the Court of Chancery that creditors of insolvent Delaware limited liability companies do not have standing to sue derivatively. This contrasts with Delaware corporations: the Delaware courts have recognized that when a corporation becomes insolvent, creditors become the residual risk-bearers and are permitted to sue derivatively on behalf of a corporation to the same extent as stockholders.

Introduction

On June 23, 2011, after fifteen years of hugely acrimonious litigation, the Supreme Court of the United States (the “Court”) issued a decision on a narrow legal issue that may end up significantly limiting the scope of bankruptcy courts’ core jurisdiction.  

Section 108 of the Bankruptcy Code grants a two-year extension of time for a trustee in bankruptcy (or a debtor in possession) to bring law suits, provided that the applicable period to sue didn’t expire before the petition date. It also gives a short extension to the trustee for filing pleadings, curing defaults, and performing other acts on behalf of the debtor. These provisions afford a trustee and debtor in possession valuable time to discover and evaluate potential causes of action and to perform other acts to preserve the debtor’s rights.

By a judgment handed down on 26 October 2010 in Sugar Hut Group Ltd & Ors v Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) Plc & Ors [2010] EWHC 2636 (Comm), Mr Justice Burton in the Commercial Court held that insurers were entitled to avoid, for a material non-disclosure of a corporate re-organisation, a policy which could otherwise have covered losses arising from a fire at the premises of the insureds.

In a recent decision, SEC v Byers,1 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that district courts possess the authority and discretion to bar the filing of involuntary bankruptcy petitions without the district court’s permission.

Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a foreign representative of a foreign insolvency proceeding to seek a bankruptcy court’s assistance in an ancillary proceeding upon recognition of the foreign proceeding. Upon recognition, Chapter 15 empowers a bankruptcy court to grant broad relief to a foreign representative to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of its creditors in the United States.

In Clare Horwood & Others v Land of Leather Limited (In Administration) and Zurich Insurance Plc the Commercial Court was asked to consider in the context of a claim under the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 whether a compromise agreement entered into by an insured without the insurer's specific instructions in writing was in breach of a policy term. Under the compromise agreement, the insured had released a third party from an obligation to indemnify it in respect of various personal injury claims.