In the case of United States of America v. Edward P. Bond, No. 12-4803 (2d. Cir. August 13, 2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Second Circuit") issued a decision that could have far-reaching effects on how liquidating chapter 11 bankruptcy cases will be handled in the future.
On April 17, 2014, the United States Bankruptcy Judge Sean H. Lane issued an opinion in the Waterford Wedgwood bankruptcy discussing at length one of the defenses available to preference defendants. The opinion turns upon the scope of “ordinary business terms,” the objective prong of the ordinary course of business defense.
In its bankruptcy filing under Japan's Civil Rehabilitation Law, Mt. Gox claims 6.5 billion yen, or around $64 million, in liabilities and 3.84 billion yen, or around $38 million, in assets.
Last week, the 8th Circuit B.A.P. affirmed, first noting that criminal judgments, including restitution awards and liens, are afforded special protection from bankruptcy discharge.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, a lawsuit to recover avoidable preference payments must be filed prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Specifically, such lawsuits must be commenced before the later of 1. two years after the commencement of the case or 2. one year after the appointment or election of the first Trustee, provided that the two-year period has not already expired.
On April 29, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to hear an appeal of the Second Circuit's decision dismissing, as equitably moot, appeals arising out of the bankruptcy of Charter Communications and let stand the opinion in In re Charter Communications, Inc., 691 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2012). As a result, the application of the equitable mootness doctrine, as it applies to bankruptcy appeals, will continue to vary among jurisdictions.
In Morning Mist Holdings Limited v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Limited), Case No. 11-4376, 2013 WL 1593348 (2d Cir.
In a corporate system based in part on the separation of ownership and control, the relationship between principals and agents is riddled with agency problems: Among them are potential conflicts of interest where agents may abuse their fiduciary position for their own benefit as opposed to the benefit of the principals to whom they are obligated. Delineating the agents' fiduciary duties is thus a central focus of corporate law, and the dereliction of those duties often comes under scrutiny in the bankruptcy context.