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A bedrock principle underlying chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is that creditors, shareholders, and other stakeholders should be provided with adequate information to make an informed decision to either accept or reject a chapter 11 plan. For this reason, the Bankruptcy Code provides that any "solicitation" of votes for or against a plan must be preceded or accompanied by stakeholders' receipt of a "disclosure statement" approved by the bankruptcy court explaining the background of the case as well as the key provisions of the chapter 11 plan.

In 2023, we saw an increase in both voluntary administration and receivership appointments in Australia. In the context of Australia's economic climate this was unsurprising — debtor companies were grappling with volatile markets, supply chain disruptions and uncertain economic conditions, and secured lenders were invoking either or both of these regimes as a means of protecting their investments.

Investors in the Australian market are more sophisticated than ever and – unsurprisingly – so too are the restructuring transactions being promoted by these investors. One such transaction is the credit bid. While not a transaction structure that is formally recognised in Australia, a credit bid is a valuable tool in a financier's playbook that can be implemented to achieve a return where the original financing is unable to be repaid in accordance with its terms.

Credit Bidding

A creditors' scheme of arrangement ("Scheme") can be a powerful restructuring tool implemented to achieve a variety of outcomes for a business, ranging from deleveraging or a debt-to-equity conversion to a merger and/or issue of new debt/equity instruments. When managed appropriately, a Scheme can reshape a business' debt and equity profile, setting it up for an improved go-forward operating platform. Below we set out an outline of the Scheme process in Australia and consider some key features that are unique to Australian schemes.

In Short

The Situation: The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether § 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code, which limits a party's ability to undo an asset transfer made to a good-faith purchaser in a bankruptcy case, is jurisdictional.

The ability of a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to assume, assume and assign, or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases is an important tool designed to promote a "fresh start" for debtors and to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. However, the Bankruptcy Code establishes strict requirements for the assumption or assignment of contracts and leases.

As participants in the Australian debt restructuring market continue to innovate we expect to see an increase in these control transactions, testing further again the Australian statutory regimes.

On April 19, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal of a landmark 2019 decision issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit regarding the applicability of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor for certain securities, commodity, or forward contract payments to prevent the avoidance in bankruptcy of $8.3 billion in payments made to the shareholders of Tribune Co. as part of its 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO").

On October 26, 2020, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas issued a long-awaited ruling on whether natural gas exploration and production company Ultra Petroleum Corp. ("UPC") must pay a make-whole premium to noteholders under its confirmed chapter 11 plan and whether the noteholders are entitled to postpetition interest on their claims pursuant to the "solvent-debtor exception." On remand from the U.S.