This week’s TGIF considers a recent decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Forex Capital Trading Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Invesus Group Limited [2024] NSWSC 867). Justice Ball determined that admission of a proof of debt by a liquidator was not akin to a judgment or settlement, and that such an admission did not create a new liability of the company.
Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code offers powerful protection for good-faith purchasers in bankruptcy sales because it limits appellate review of an approved sale, irrespective of the legal merits of the appeal. Specifically, it provides that the reversal or modification of an order approving the sale of assets in bankruptcy does not affect the validity of the sale to a good-faith purchaser unless the party challenging the sale obtains a stay pending its appeal of the order. That is, section 363(m) renders an appeal "statutorily moot" absent a stay of the sale order.
The practice of conferring "derivative standing" on official creditors' committees or individual creditors to assert claims on behalf of a bankruptcy estate in cases where the debtor or a bankruptcy trustee is unwilling or unable to do so is well-established. However, until recently, Delaware bankruptcy courts have uniformly limited the practice in cases where applicable non-bankruptcy law provides that creditors do not have standing to bring claims on behalf of certain entities.
In a recent decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (In the matter of Pacific Plumbing Group Pty Limited (in liquidation) [2024] NSWSC 525), Justice Black determined that a payment made by a third party was not an unfair preference because the payment did not diminish assets available to creditors.
Key Takeaways
The Federal Court in Morgan, in the matter of Traditional Values Management Limited (in liq)[2024] FCA 74, approved an abridged process that allowed the liquidator to admit debts of a group of unsecured creditors without requiring a formal proof of debt.
Key Takeaways
The Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly authorize the equitable remedy of "substantive consolidation"—i.e., treating the assets and liabilities of two or more related entities as if they belonged to a single, consolidated bankruptcy estate. However, it is well recognized that a bankruptcy court has the authority to order such relief under appropriate circumstances in the exercise of its broad equitable powers when each of the original entities are already debtors subject to the court's jurisdiction.
In this week’s TGIF, we consider ASIC v Bettles [2023] FCA 975 and ASIC v Jones [2023] WASCA 130, two cases which bring into focus the conduct of insolvency practitioners and alleged abrogation of their duties and independence.
Key takeaways
In this week’s TGIF, we consider Jahani, in the matter of Ralan Property Services Pty Ltd (receivers and managers appointed) (in liq) [2023] FCA 738, a Federal Court decision approving the liquidators’ entry into funding agreements.
Key takeaways
To shield bankruptcy trustees and certain other entities from litigation arising from actions taken in their official capacity, the "Barton doctrine"—now more than a century old—provides that such litigation may be commenced only with the authority of the appointing court. The doctrine has certain exceptions, one of which—the "ultra vires exception"—was recently examined by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as an apparent matter of first impression.
In this week’s TGIF, we consider the Court of Appeal’s decision in Anchorage Capital Master Offshore Ltd v Sparkes [2023] NSWCA 88 and the challenges faced by lenders in accepting representations as to solvency and the financial position of borrowers.
Key takeaways