In Gulfport Energy Corp. v. FERC, 41 F.4th 667 (5th Cir. 2022), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit tripled down on its nearly two-decades-long view that filed-rate contracts regulated under the National Gas Act (the "NGA") and the Federal Power Act (the "FPA") can be rejected in bankruptcy without the consent of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). Reaffirming its previous rulings in In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2004), and In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 28 F.4th 629 (5th Cir.
Even before chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 2005 to govern cross-border bankruptcy proceedings, the enforceability of a foreign court order approving a restructuring plan that modified or discharged U.S. law-governed debt was well recognized under principles of international comity. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently reaffirmed this concept in In re Modern Land (China) Co., Ltd., 641 B.R. 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2022).
When lenders use an aggressive strategy to deal with a financially troubled borrower that ultimately files for bankruptcy protection, stakeholders in the case, including chapter 11 debtors, trustees, committees, and even individual creditors or shareholders, frequently pursue causes of action against the lenders in an effort to augment or create recoveries.
Whether a contract is "executory" such that it can be assumed, rejected, or assigned in bankruptcy is a question infrequently addressed by the circuit courts of appeals. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit provided some rare appellate court-level guidance on the question in Matter of Falcon V, L.L.C., 44 F.4th 348 (5th Cir. 2022). The Fifth Circuit affirmed lower-court rulings determining that a surety contract was not executory because the surety had already posted irrevocable surety bonds and did not owe further performance to the debtors.
“… [B]ecause Congress has not clearly abrogated the solvent-debtor exception,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a reorganized solvent debtor had to “pay what it promised now that it is financially capable.” In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 2022 WL 8025329, *1, (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022) (2-1). Moreover, “given [the debtor’s ] solvency, post-petition interest is to be calculated according to the agreed-upon … contractual default rate …,” not the “much lower Federal Judgment Rate …,” held the court. Id.
The “connections” of the chairman (“W”) of the debtor’s investment bank (“S”) to his family’s foundations do “not give rise to an actual, active conflict of any kind,” held a bankruptcy judge in the Southern District of New York on Oct. 17, 2022. In re SAS A.B., 2022 WL 10189110, *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2022). According to the court, it “is only through strained speculation [by the U.S. Trustee] that a potential issue can even be posited.” Accord, In re Harold & Williams Dev. Co., 977 F.2d 906 (4th Cir.
“…[B]ecause Congress has not clearly abrogated the solvent-debtor exception,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a reorganized solvent debtor had to “pay what it promised now that it is financially capable.” In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 2022 WL 8025329, *1, (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022) (2-1). Moreover, “given [the debtor’s ] solvency, post-petition interest is to be calculated according to the agreed-upon … contractual default rate …,” not the “much lower Federal Judgment Rate . . .,” held the court. Id.
The Third Circuit recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to disqualify the plaintiff’s law firm in a large adversary proceeding, holding that it had not abused its discretion because the plaintiff law firm (W) had “complied with” American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10(a)(2). In re Maxus Energy Corp., 2022 WL 4113656, *4 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2022). According to the court, a lawyer (B) who “moved from” the defendant’s law firm “to the [plaintiff’s] firm” was not cause for W (the new firm) to be disqualified.
Federal district courts, with the consent of the parties, are authorized by statute to refer "civil matter[s]" to magistrate judges for the purpose of conducting all proceedings and entering a judgment in the litigation. In the case of an appeal to a district court from a bankruptcy court, however, this statutory authority arguably conflicts with another statutory provision dictating that appeals from a bankruptcy court order or judgment be heard by a "district court" or a "bankruptcy appellate panel." This apparent conflict was recently addressed by the U.S.
The appellate courts have been busy explaining or clarifying preference and fraudulent transfer law. Although novices may think the Bankruptcy Code (Code) is clear on its face, imaginative counsel have found gaps in the statute and generated rafts of litigation since the Code's enactment in 1979. Recent appellate decisions, summarized below, show that courts are still making new law or refining prior case law.
Preferences