What are the limits of a bankruptcy court’s authority to issue final orders and judgments? Does a bankruptcy court have authority under Article III of the U.S. Constitution to enter final orders in quintessential bankruptcy matters such as fraudulent transfer claims, or are the court’s powers more constrained? While the Supreme Court’s rulings in Stern v. Marshall, 546 U.S. 462 (2011), Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25 (2014) and Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct.

In prior posts, we examined whether state-licensed marijuana businesses, and those doing business with marijuana businesses, can seek relief under the Bankruptcy Code. As we noted, the Office of the United States Trustee (the “UST”) has taken the position that a marijuana business cannot seek bankruptcy relief because the business itself violates the Controlled Substances Act 21, U.S.C.

The recent decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Provider Meds, L.L.C. is a stark reminder to chapter 7 trustees that they have an affirmative obligation to examine a debtor’s assets. A trustee’s failure to conduct a sufficient and timely examination may deprive the estate of significant value.

Last Thursday's decision in the WA Supreme Court to allow a sale to insiders of a company subject to a deed of company arrangement will make the restructuring process smoother for administrators, who can now negotiate with a wider pool of potential purchasers, as Chapter 2E of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which deals with related party transactions, will not apply (Mighty River International v Bryan Hughes and Daniel Bredenkamp as Deed Administrators of Mesa Minerals Ltd (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) [No 2] [2018] WASC 368; Clayton Utz acted for the deed administrators of Mes

In prior posts, we discussed the perplexing issue of how and whether a trademark licensee is protected when the trademark owner/licensor files a bankruptcy petition and moves to reject the trademark license in accordance with section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.

We have discussed plan releases in prior posts. Oftentimes, disputes involving plan releases revolve around whether, and in what contexts, third-party releases in plans are appropriate. Recently, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the relatively unique question of whether releases in a confirmed plan are binding upon post-confirmation purchasers of the debtor’s stock.

Some 25 years after Harmer promised a faster, more efficient and commercial approach for dealing with failed and failing companies, Australia's highest court has this morning confirmed that creditors can contractually bind a company and all stakeholders to a moratorium extension via a properly formed holding DOCA (Mighty River International Limited v Hughes [2018] HCA 38; Clayton Utz acted for the successful Deed Administrators of Mesa Minerals Limited).

The two limbs of the defence to an unfair preference claim under section 588FG(1)(b) and (2)(b) of the Corporations Act have separate work to do.

In a useful decision for liquidators and the insolvency industry, the WA Court of Appeal has clarified the nature of the tests creditors need to satisfy to maintain a defence to a liquidator's unfair preference claim in section 588FG(1)(b) or (2)(b) of the Corporations Act (White & Templeton v ACN 153 152 731 Pty Ltd (in liq) & Anor [2018] WASCA 119). 

Can an individual debtor make an oral false statement about an asset to a creditor and get away with it by discharging the creditor’s claim in his or her bankruptcy? On June 4, 2018, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling in which the Court unanimously answered this question in the affirmative.

Can the recipient of an actual fraudulent transfer effectively “cleanse” the transfer if the funds are returned to the debtor? In a recent opinion, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania answered that question in the affirmative.