Changes to the Australian Insolvency regime continue to progress through the legislature as part of the Treasury Laws Amendment (2017 Enterprise Incentives No.2) Bill 2017. The amendments are intended to allow companies and directors protections whilst they informally restructure, rather than requiring potentially premature entry into formal insolvency proceedings. It is hoped this will increase the turn-around prospects of those companies.

A case of two companies, one incorporated in Dubai and the other in England, involved in a network of businesses producing contrived fancy colour diamond valuations were eventually wound up by English courts in the interest of the public.

Marex Financial Limited v. Carlos Sevilleja Garcia [2017] EWHC 918 (Comm)

This recent decision on a jurisdictional challenge has provided greater clarity and potentially created a tortious cause of action where a debtor dissipates assets prior to judgment and subsequent freezing order.

Background

Karhoo, a US incorporated company able to benefit from the Chapter 15 US bankruptcy code provision for foreign insolvency proceedings following UK Administration.

In the matter of the désastres of Gail Alison Cochrane and Orb a.r.l.

1. Harbour Fund II LP v. (1) Orb a.r.l. (2) Litigation Capital Funding [2017]JRC171 ("the September judgment")

2. Harbour Fund II LP v. (1) Orb a.r.l. (2) Dr Gail Cochrane [2017]JRC007 ("the January judgment")

3. Representation of the Viscount re Cochrane and Orb a.r.l. [2017]JRC025 ("the February judgment")

English Liquidators of a fraudulent investment company were able to navigate a complex web of defunct companies and trusts to realise assets in a Jersey company.

The partners of Arck LLP (in Liquidation), registered in England ("Arck"), an investment firm, were convicted of fraud and forgery. Richard Clay, thought to be the driving force of the scandal, is now serving a 10 years 10 months prison sentence and his deputy Kathryn Clark received a two year suspended sentence.

We have written in the past about the doctrine of equitable mootness. A March 30, 2017 per curiam affirmance by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Beem v. Ferguson (In re Ferguson) explores the concept and limitations of equitable mootness and distinguishes it from the related doctrine of constitutional mootness.

What can a lender do about successive bankruptcy filings by a borrower? What can lessors do when their tenants file successive bankruptcy petitions? A recent decision by a bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of New York gives guidance on these questions.

In a prior post, we discussed the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Jevic Holding Corp., where the court upheld the use of so-called “structured dismissals” in bankruptcy cases, and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari. Yesterday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Jevic. The Court’s ultimate ruling will likely have a significant impact upon bankruptcy practice.

What does it mean to “cure” a default in the context of a plan of reorganization? This question arises by virtue of section 1123(a)(5)(G) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires that a plan provide adequate means for the plan’s implementation, including the “curing or waiving of any default.” On November 4, 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals defined what it means to “cure” by holding that a debtor can only cure a contractual default under a plan of reorganization by complying with contractual post-default interest rate provisions.