The hair salon Regis announced recently that the company has entered administration. The news might not come as a surprise because the chain, prior to the company’s administration, was subject to a company voluntary arrangement (“CVA”) whose validity was challenged by landlords.

The joint administrator of Regis commented: “trading challenges, coupled with the uncertainty caused by the legal challenge, have necessitated the need for an administration appointment”.

Today the Government published draft provisions for inclusion in the Finance Bill which will amend the Insolvency Act 1986 and grant HMRC preferential status on insolvency. A status that was removed in 2003 but which will be re-instated (in part) from 6 April 2020.

Despite huge concern from the lending market, voiced in responses to the Government’s consultation on this measure, the only material change we can see is confirmation that preferential status will not apply to insolvency proceedings commenced before 6 April 2020.

The proposal to reinstate Crown preference in insolvency has met resistance from all angles; the insolvency profession, turnaround experts, accountants, lawyers and funders. But despite HMRC’s bold statement in its consultation paper that the re-introduction of Crown preference will have little impact on funders, it is clear following a discussion with lenders that it may well have a far wider impact on existing and new business, business rescue and the economy in general than HMRC believes.

On Jan. 19, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated a bankruptcy court decision awarding Ultra Petroleum Corp. noteholders $201 million in make-whole payments and $186 million in post-petition interest. Under the note agreement, upon a bankruptcy filing, the issuer is obligated for a make-whole amount equal to the discounted value of the remaining scheduled payments (including principal and interest that would be due after prepayment) less the principal amount of the notes.

In the holiday season many of us jet-set to foreign shores – but do we ever think about how we might get home if our budget airline goes bust or are we just hunting for the best deals to make the pound stretch further?

The last decade has seen a number of airlines collapse or be swallowed up by competitors:

On Jan. 17, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the decision of the District Court for the Southern District of New York in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v.

In a recent case arising out of the bankruptcy of the Yellowstone Mountain Club, a private ski club for the ultrawealthy, Blixseth v. Brown (In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC) (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff needed the bankruptcy court’s permission to bring post-petition claims against the chair of Yellowstone’s Unsecured Creditors Committee (“UCC”).

The Third Circuit recently affirmed that a debtor in Chapter 11 can use a tender offer to settle claims without running afoul of the Bankruptcy Code. Although In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.is limited to its particular facts and circumstances, the decision could lead to increased use of tender offers prior to confirmation of a bankruptcy plan.

Several recent cases in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York have created ambiguity about when distressed exchange offers violate Section 316(b) of the 1939 Trust Indenture Act (the “TIA”). It appears that plaintiffs’ lawyers are using this ambiguity to challenge distressed exchange offers. The threat of litigation may give minority bondholders a powerful tool to hinder less than fully consensual out-of-court restructurings and provide them with increased leverage in negotiations.

Market participants involved in distressed exchange offers have become accustomed to grappling with the implications of Trust Indenture Act Section 316(b) in the context of potential exit consents, i.e., are the contemplated amendments to the indenture governing the securities subject to the exchange significant enough to impair or affect the right of a holder to receive payment of principal and interest on or after the due dates of the relevant note?