A “structured dismissal” of a chapter 11 case following a sale of substantially all of the debtor’s assets has become increasingly common as a way to minimize costs and maximize creditor recoveries. However, only a handful of rulings have been issued on the subject, perhaps because bankruptcy and appellate courts are unclear as to whether the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the remedy.

It is well recognized that, in keeping with the "fresh start" or "rehabilitative" policy, the Bankruptcy Code invalidates after-acquired property clauses in prepetition security agreements, but also includes an exception to the general rule for prepetition liens on the proceeds, products, offspring, or profits of prepetition collateral. Less well understood is that there is an "exception to the exception" if a bankruptcy court determines that the "equities of the case" suggest that property acquired by the estate should be free of such liens.

Section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code provides special protection for tenants if a trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") rejects an unexpired lease under which the debtor was the lessor by giving the tenant the option of retaining possession of the leased premises. Although the provision clearly describes what rights a tenant has if it makes such an election, it does not unequivocally address the extent of the electing tenant's obligations under the rejected lease or any related agreements. The U.S.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently added some weight to the majority rule on a hot-button issue for claims traders. InIn re Firestar Diamond, Inc., 615 B.R. 161 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020), the court ruled that a transferred claim can be disallowed under section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code even if the entity holding the claim is not the recipient of a voidable transfer. According to the court, claim disallowance under section 502(d) "rests on the claim and not the claim holder."

Under the "single-satisfaction rule," although a bankruptcy trustee or a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") may seek to avoid and recover avoidable transfers of a debtor's property from more than one transferee, the aggregate recovery is limited to the value of the property transferred. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit examined this rule in Jones v. Brand Law Firm PA (In re Belmonte), 931 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2019).

The recent chapter 11 filings by PG&E Corp. and its Pacific Gas & Electric Co. utility subsidiary (collectively, "PG&E") and FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. have reignited the debate over the power of a U.S. bankruptcy court to authorize the rejection of contracts regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). Only a handful of courts have addressed this thorny issue to date, and with conflicting results in a controversy that may ultimately need to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court or legislative action.

Amid the explosion of trading in claims against distressed and bankrupt entities, courts in recent years have issued numerous rulings of interest to both buyers and sellers.

Among other things, new Federal Law No. 266-FZ (July 29, 2017) (the "Amendment") supersedes provisions concerning the vicarious liability of "controlling persons" for a bankrupt corporate debtor’s obligations set forth in RF Law No. 127-FZ on Insolvency (October 26, 2002) (the "Insolvency Law").

The Amendment defines a "controlling person" as any individual or entity who, during the three-year period preceding the existence of "signs of insolvency" or court approval of a bankruptcy petition, had the power to direct the debtor’s affairs, including the execution of contracts.

An important aspect of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241 ("PROMESA")—the temporary stay of creditor collection efforts that came into effect upon its enactment—was the subject of a ruling handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. In Peaje Investments LLC v. García-Padilla, 845 F.3d 505 (1st Cir. 2017), the First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part a lower court order denying two motions for relief from the PROMESA stay.

In In re Abeinsa Holding, Inc., 2016 BL 335099 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 6, 2016), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware addressed what it perceived to be a flaw in the approach that many courts apply to motions for relief from the automatic stay.