On July 22, 2008, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed denial of the motion of Parmalat S.p.A. ("New Parmalat") to extend an injunction provided to its predecessor, Parmalat Finanziaria, S.p.A., under Bankruptcy Code section 304, against securities fraud actions.1 Although the appeal addressed the issue of injunction in the context of superseded Bankruptcy Code section 304, this decision and the underlying lower court opinion signify other issues of broader import, including the need for careful plan drafting and the complexities inherent in cross-border cases.

In the wake of recent bankruptcy filings by several prominent financial institutions, there’s a growing interest in changing standard credit documentation to address the risks of defaulting lenders and nonperforming administrative agents. Here are credit agreement provisions that financial institutions, acting as swingline lenders and letter of credit issuers, can require to protect themselves against the risk of a defaulting lender.

The rejection of collective bargaining agreements or modification of retiree benefits under Bankruptcy Code §§ 1113 and 1114, respectively, were again of central importance in a number of airline cases.

A recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit appears to have further raised the hurdle to equitably subordinate claims. Continuing what appears to be a move toward a narrower interpretation of equitable subordination, the Seventh Circuit held that misconduct alone does not provide sufficient justification to equitably subordinate a claim; injury to the interests of other creditors is required as well.

When a creditor seeks equitable relief in a bankruptcy court, must the court always follow common law principles of equity? Not according to several courts, including the Second Circuit. Concluding that the granting of equitable remedies may circumvent the Bankruptcy Code's equitable distribution system, courts have limited the application of equitable remedies in the bankruptcy context.

Setoff is a doctrine based as much on practical considerations as on equitable ones.

The recent financial crisis has resulted in events that once seemed impossible. Recently, in the federal government’s attempts to bail out the auto industry, an event unprecedented in American history almost occurred: the forced subordination of existing secured debt to new loans issued by the federal government. If the government were to revive this concept in future bailouts and attempt to subordinate the liens of secured creditors, a suit challenging the constitutionality of such action would have a good chance of success.

The Potential For Forced Subordination

On February 11, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, addressing an apparent issue of first impression, ruled that a series of gas supply contracts might constitute “commodity forward agreements” and, in turn, “swap agreements,” exempt from the court-appointed trustee’s avoidance actions.1 The Court reversed and remanded the decision from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which had held that the commodity supply contracts at issue were insufficiently tied to financial markets to be considered protected “commodity forwar

Debt-for-debt exchanges are not new, but are worth revisiting given the current economic climate. Furthermore, the recently enacted "Stimulus Act"1 provides some temporary relief to debtors from potentially harsh tax consequences of restructuring. The following discussion is relevant to issuers (also referred to as debtors) or holders (also referred to as creditors) of debt who are "US persons" (as defined in the US Internal Revenue Code).2

In order to illustrate some of the key US federal income tax consequences of a debt-for-debt exchange, consider the following example:

The recent ruling by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana in the Chapter 11 case of In re Yellowstone Mountain Club LLC 1 (“Yellowstone”), which found that a senior secured lender had engaged in “overreaching and predatory lending practices”, suggests an application of lender liability theory from today’s perspective to a transaction that took place before the credit crisis.