On September 13, 2011, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”) approved a final rule (the “Final Rules”) to be issued jointly by the FDIC and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “Board”) intended to implement section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) which requires each non-bank financial company supervised by the Board and each bank holding company with assets of US$50 billion or more (each, a “Covered Company”)1 to report periodically to the Board, the FDIC and the Financial Stability Oversig

In re Corporateand Leisure Event Productions, Inc.,1 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona held that a state court lacks the power to enter an order in a receivership proceeding preventing the receivership defendant from filing a petition in bankruptcy.

In a recent ruling likely to be of great interest to debtors and creditors alike, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia (the “Court”) ruled in MC Asset Recovery v. Southern Company1 (the “Southern Co. Litigation”) that fraudulent transfer claims held by a bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession under the Bankruptcy Code continue to be viable at the conclusion of a bankruptcy case, even if all creditors’ claims have already been satisfied in full pursuant to a plan of reorganization.

The judgment of Snowden J. in the adjournment of the convening hearing relating to a scheme of arrangement (the “Scheme”) proposed by Indah Kiat International Finance Company B.V. (“Indah Kiat”) emphasises some important points that must be borne in mind by debtors, investors and advisers when preparing for a scheme, such as the importance of allowing sufficient time for preparation of all relevant supporting evidence and documentation, and allowing for a realistic notice period for creditors.

While fears of another downturn loom, the European financial markets have innovated, evolved and grown.

Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the period that followed, the markets have more understanding of the credit risk spectrum. This includes jurisdictional risk, available restructuring options and the complexity involved in any enforcement process.

Introduction

Over the last few years, the European leveraged finance market has seen rapid growth of senior secured high yield notes (“SSN”) and senior secured covenant-lite term loan  B (“TLB”) financings. A common feature of both SSNs and TLBs (together “Senior Secured Debt”) is that their terms typically permit the incurrence of senior unsecured debt by a borrower and its restricted subsidiaries (a “Credit Group”) subject to either satisfaction of a  financial ratio or through various permitted debt baskets.

In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Whalen (In re Enron Corp.), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York considered whether the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy payment of an employment bonus one day before it became due was “for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made” for purposes of determining whether section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code made the payment avoidable as a preferential transfer.

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (the “BAPCPA”) created an additional category of administrative expenses

Recently, in In re Northwest Airlines Corp.,1 Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper issued an opinion requiring a group of hedge funds that had formed an ad hoc committee of equity security holders (the “Ad Hoc Equity Committee”) to disclose “the amounts of claims or interests owned by the members of the committee, the times when acquired, the amounts paid therefor, and any sales or other disposition thereof” in order to comply with Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”).

Background

In a recent decision, Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts1, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a debtor has an absolute right under Section 706(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to convert a case to Chapter 13, clarifying a growing split among circuits as to whether the debtor’s bad faith conduct prior to his proposed conversion results in the forfeiture of the debtor’s right to convert.