The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has ruled that a debtor may not reduce the number of votes required to confirm a chapter 11 plan of reorganization by purchasing certain claims. Such vote “gerrymandering” resulted in an unconfirmable plan, the court ruled. In re Machne Menachem, Inc., 233 Fed. Appex. 119, 2007 WL 1157015 (3d Cir. Apr. 19, 2007 (Pa.)).
The solicitation of creditor votes on a plan is a crucial part of the chapter 11 process. At a minimum, a chapter 11 plan can be confirmed only if at least one class of impaired creditors (or interest holders) votes to accept the plan. A plan proponent’s efforts to solicit an adequate number of plan acceptances, however, may be complicated if creditors or other enfranchised stakeholders neglect (or choose not) to vote.
Legislation intended to address additional issues related Ohio’s asbestos litigation system was defeated by the Ohio House by a vote of 48-45. Senate Bill 370 House Bill 631 would have discourage “double dipping” by plaintiffs who file lawsuits in Ohio courts while making the same claims against bankruptcy trusts set up by federal bankruptcy courts.
CIT Group Inc.
DBSD Case Upholds Designation of Votes Cast By a Claims Purchaser
Rehabilitating a debtor’s business and maximizing the value of its estate for the benefit of its various stakeholders through the confirmation of a chapter 11 plan is the ultimate goal in most chapter 11 cases. Achievement of that goal, however, typically requires resolution of disagreements among various parties in interest regarding the composition of the chapter 11 plan and the form and manner of the distributions to be provided thereunder.
The solicitation of creditor votes on a plan is a crucial part of the chapter 11 process. At a minimum, a chapter 11 plan can be confirmed only if at least one class of impaired creditors (or interest holders) votes to accept the plan. A plan proponent’s efforts to solicit an adequate number of plan acceptances, however, may be complicated if creditors or other enfranchised stakeholders neglect (or choose not) to vote.
The strategic importance of classifying claims and interests under a chapter 11 plan is sometimes an invitation for creative machinations designed to muster adequate support for confirmation of the plan. Although the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally states that only “substantially similar” claims or interests can be classified together, it neither defines “substantial similarity” nor requires that all claims or interests fitting the description be classified together.
The ability of a creditor whose claim is “impaired” to vote on a chapter 11 plan is one of the most important rights conferred on creditors under the Bankruptcy Code. The voting process is an indispensable aspect of safeguards built into the statute designed to ensure that any plan ultimately confirmed by the bankruptcy court meets with the approval of requisite majorities of a debtor’s creditors and shareholders and satisfies certain minimum standards of fairness.
In a decision that may have implications for holders of community development district bonds and other similar “dirt bonds,” a Florida bankruptcy court has ruled that holders of community development district bonds do not always have plan voting rights when the underlying developer — as opposed to the development district itself — is the bankruptcy debtor.