In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Halifax Fund, L.P. (In re Applied Theory Corp.),1 the Second Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, held that an official committee of unsecured creditors (the "Committee"), under the circumstances, did not have the right to commence an adversary proceeding seeking the equitable subordination of claims held by insiders of a Chapter 11 debtor. The Applied Theory court rebuffed the Committee's characterization of its claim as a direct claim that the Committee could prosecute without the bankruptcy court's permission.

In National Energy & Gas Transmission, Inc. v. Liberty Electric Power, LLC (In re National Energy & Gas Transmission, Inc.),1 the Fourth Circuit held that, where an unsecured creditor receives payment from a non-debtor guarantor in partial satisfaction of a claim against the debtor, for purposes of the creditor's claim against the debtor, the creditor may not choose to allocate such payment to post-petition interest.

In Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Company, the Supreme Court held that federal bankruptcy law does not automatically disallow claims for post-petition attorneys' fees incurred by a prepetition unsecured creditor simply because such fees are incurred in litigating issues arising under the Bankruptcy Code. The Court, however, left open the issue whether such claims may be disallowed on the basis that the attorneys' fees were incurred post-petition.

In UPS Capital Business Credit v. Gencarelli (In re Gencarelli),1 the First Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a secured creditor is entitled to collect a prepayment penalty from a solvent debtor. The Court found that the secured creditor could collect the penalty, whether or not it is reasonable, so long as the penalty is enforceable under state law. The Court reasoned that any other holding would leave open the possibility that an unsecured creditor could recover more from a solvent estate than a secured creditor.

Background

Owners of bank loan participations take on two kinds of credit risk: (i) the borrower’s failure to pay the underlying bank loan, and (ii) the loan participation grantor’s bankruptcy. The first risk is well understood and carefully analyzed in each transaction. This memorandum focuses on the second kind of credit risk assumed by a participant -- grantor insolvency.

In March 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided In re Airadigm Communications, Inc. (Airadigm Communications, Inc. v. FCC),1 a case that built upon the Supreme Court’s decision in FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc (“NextWave”).2 In NextWave, the Supreme Court held that the FCC’s participation in a bankruptcy proceeding is subject to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has issued a pair of rulings in a case involving high-stakes litigation—with a claim in excess of $230 million, including $3 million in postpetition attorneys’ fees and costs. Beyond the high stakes, the court’s conclusions in Centre Ins. Co. v. SNTL Corp. (In re SNTL Corp.), 380 B.R. 204 (9th Cir. BAP 2007) have far-reaching implications; they are likely to affect a multitude of financing transactions that become entangled in bankruptcy.

The collapse of Lehman Brothers was a major test of the procedures developed by market participants to address counterparty credit risk and has uncovered deficiencies in risk management policies and their application.

In recent opinions, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have revisited the doctrine of equitable subordination and have underscored the requirement that, before a court can equitably subordinate a creditor’s claim, the court must find that other creditors have been harmed by the actions of the creditor. Importantly, both decisions stress that equitable subordination is meant to be remedial and not punitive, and may not be imposed merely because a creditor has engaged in misconduct.

As the Madoff Securities and Stanford Financial schemes have unraveled in recent months, financial industry participants have had to scrutinize closely their involvement with these entities. A key issue in each of these cases will be the extent to which the trustee (or similar representative) can “claw back” payments made as part of the Ponzi and related fraudulent schemes. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently considered similar facts in Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P.