Fifth Circuit Holds that Disallowance of Claim Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code Does Not Render Such Claim Impaired and Casts Doubt on Creditors’ Ability to Recover Make-Whole Amounts or Post-Petition Interest at the Default Contract Rate
Executive Summary
Under Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor or trustee can sell estate assets “free and clear of any interest” in such assets. This short, simple string of six words represents one of the most powerful tools in the bankruptcy professional’s arsenal.
While the majority of the cases covered by the Weil Bankruptcy Blog address issues arising in corporate restructurings, cases concerning individual debtors often offer interesting insights into the history and meaning of various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
“The world is full of obvious things which nobody by any chance ever observes.”
Sherlock Holmes
Two recent decisions from the District Court for the Southern District of New York have renewed interest in the Trust Indenture Act and the ability of minority bondholders to use it as a shield to protect its rights in an out-of-court nonconsensual restructuring: Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v.
Two recent decisions from the District Court for the Southern District of New York have renewed interest in the Trust Indenture Act and the ability of minority bondholders to use it as a shield to protect their rights in an out-of-court nonconsensual restructuring: Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v.
On August 18, 2011, Mr. Justice Morawetz, of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, released an important decision in regard to preference actions in the matter of Tucker v. Aero Inventory (UK) Limited (together with Aero Inventory plc, Aero).
Background
Before 1993, the question of whether a creditor of a corporation being wound up had received an unfair preference from that corporation was determined under section 122 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). In 1993, a new Part 5.7B was inserted into the Corporations Act to deal with voidable transactions such as unfair preferences. Since then two lines of divergent judicial authority have developed: