Do officers of a public corporation have an affirmative obligation to monitor corporate affairs? Yes, according to Judge Walsh in his recently issued memorandum opinion in Miller v. McDonald (In re World Health Alternatives, Inc.).1 Although "Caremark" oversight liability had previously generally only been imposed on directors of public corporations, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware determined that officers are not immune from such liability as a matter of law.

In re Adelphia Communications Corp.,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently held that neither a creditor’s aggressive litigation tactics resulting in the creditor’s prospective receipt under a proposed plan of special consideration for voting in favor of the plan, which special consideration other members of the same class that voted against the plan would not obtain, nor the creditor’s ownership of claims in several debtors, in a multi-debtor Chapter 11 case, was a sufficient basis for the “draconian sanction” of disallowing such creditor’s votes

Companies that plan to sell goods or services to a debtor in bankruptcy should be aware of a recent case decided by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, holding that a trustee may avoid a debtor’s post-petition transfers of cash collateral if such transfers were made without the consent of the secured party or court order.1

With US Circuit Courts split on the issue of whether bankruptcy courts have the power to release third parties from creditors’ claims without the creditors’ consent, a move known as non-consensual third-party release, the Seventh Circuit recently weighed in the affirmative in In re Airadigm Communications, Inc.1 With the split widening between the circuits on this matter, it seems more likely than ever that the Supreme Court could weigh in on and decide this critical issue to lenders and others.2

Equitable mootness is a doctrine grounded in equity pursuant to which an appeals court will dismiss an appeal of a bankruptcy order — even if effective relief could conceivably have been granted — because the implementation of such relief (e.g., the reversal of a bankruptcy court order) would be inequitable to third parties. This doctrine may be applied to achieve the necessary finality of bankruptcy orders and decisions that is required to effectuate the successful, expedient reorganization of debtors in bankruptcy.2

Not necessarily so, according to the recent rulings of Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper in the US$27 billion General Growth Properties Chapter 11 bankruptcy—at least with respect to the issue of substantive consolidation.

Must creditors holding claims denominated in a foreign currency against a debtor in a US bankruptcy case bear the risk of a postpetition decline in the value of the dollar? In In re Global Power Equipment Group Inc.,1 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware says yes, holding that, pursuant to section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, a contested claim denominated in foreign currency must be converted into United States currency as of the petition date instead of a later judgment or breach date.

The Conversion Date Dispute

In re Foamex Int’l, Inc., et al.,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that the damage cap contained in section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code applies not only to rental payments, but also to damages from the breach of any lease covenants, including maintenance and repair obligations. In doing so, the Court reduced a specific landlord’s claim and recovery by more than $700,000 and established precedent that could diminish the claims of landlords in other cases pending and filed in Delaware.

Background

On September 15, 2009, the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York ordered Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to make payments to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”) under a prepetition interest rate swap agreement guaranteed by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI” and, together with LBSF, “Lehman”) after Metavante had suspended ordinary course settlement payments under the swap.1 Metavante claimed a contractual right to withhold payment under Section 2(a)(iii) of the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement as a result of Lehman’s bankruptcy.

Sometimes the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code leads to unexpected results. In a recent case, the US Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit (BAP) has ruled that section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code requires the subordination of certain claims against a debtor to all equity interests in the debtor, even though such subordination may mean that the holders of the claims will receive nothing on the claims.