In a decision that may have significant practical implications to the practice of bankruptcy law, the U.S. Supreme Court recently declared, on constitutional grounds, that a bankruptcy court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a debtor’s state law counterclaims, thus considerably limiting the ability of the bankruptcy court to fully and finally adjudicate claims in a bankruptcy case. Stern v. Marshall, No. 10-179 (June 23, 2011).

The Ninth Circuit in In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 8729 (9th Cir. April 30, 2013) recently reversed precedent and established that bankruptcy courts in the Ninth Circuit have the power to determine whether a transaction creates a debt or equity interest for purposes of § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit joins the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Tenth Circuits in expressly recognizing bankruptcy courts’ ability to recharacterize claims in bankruptcy proceedings.

 In a decision published October 19, 2020, Judge Frank J. Bailey of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts found that an Indian tribe was not subject to the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay.

In a recent decision by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the court adopted a flexible approach to consensual third party releases in a plan of reorganization. In In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 384 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 31, 2013), the court permitted third party releases where creditors failed to opt out of the release provisions of the plan either by not submitting their vote on the plan, or by voting against the plan but failing to check the “opt out” box on the ballot.

In its ruling in FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Sweeney (In re Centaur, LLC), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware addressed the Supreme Court’s recent clarification of the scope of Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e)’s “safe harbor” provision, affirming a more narrow interpretation of Section 546(e).

In Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, the absolute priority rule requires a debtor’s creditors be paid in full before equity investors receive any value. However, existing equity investors occasionally seek to invest new money in the plan of reorganization process and argue that such investment justifies retention of equity in the reorganized company; equity which otherwise would pass to impaired creditors.

It is not unusual for a creditor of a debtor to cry foul that a non-debtor affiliate has substantial assets, but has not joined the bankruptcy. In some cases, the creditor may assert that even though its claim, on its face, is solely against the debtor, the debtor and the non-debtor conducted business as a single unit, or that the debtor indicated that the assets of the non-debtor were available to satisfy claims. In these circumstances, the creditor would like nothing more than to drag that asset-rich non-debtor into the bankruptcy to satisfy its claims. Is that possible?

A recent ruling in the American Airlines bankruptcy case enforcing an automatic acceleration upon bankruptcy provision serves as a reminder that the enforceability of so-called ipso facto provisions in debt instruments remains an unsettled, forum-dependent question.      

InIn Re Lexington Hospitality Group, LLC, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky thwarted a lender’s efforts to control whether its borrower could file bankruptcy. As a condition to the loan, the lender mandated that the borrower’s operating agreement have certain provisions that require the affirmative vote of an “Independent Manager” and 75% of the members to authorize a bankruptcy.

In a much anticipated opinion,In re TOUSA, Inc., --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 1673910 (11th Cir. May 15, 2012), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has resolved a disagreement between the Bankruptcy Court and District Court for the Southern District of Florida by upholding the Bankruptcy Court’s findings—to the chagrin of lenders, who are now arguably exposed to new liabilities and higher standards of due diligence.