Last week, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas granted involuntary bankruptcy petitions against ten US subsidiaries of Mexican glassmaker Vitro S.A.B. de C.V. (the “New Debtor Subsidiaries” and “Vitro”, respectively). The ruling is a win in the multi-paned litigation involving certain petitioning noteholders (the “Noteholders”) in their fight against Vitro’s efforts to effect a non-consensual restructuring of their debt through a Mexican insolvency proceeding.
Becoming the first Court of Appeals to address an issue that has divided the bankruptcy and district courts, the Ninth Circuit adopted a forceful view of Stern v. Marshall,1 to hold in In re Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.2 that absent the parties’ consent, the limitations imposed by Article III of the Constitution deprive a bankruptcy judge of the constitutional authority to enter judgment on fraudulent transfer claims brought against parties who have not filed proofs of claim.
The Ninth Circuit recently held that: (1) bankruptcy courts lack the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on all fraudulent transfer claims against non-claimants, whether brought under state or federal law, and (2) a defendant can waive such an argument by not asserting the applicability of Stern v. Marshall1 at the trial level.2 Further, in dicta, the court noted that bankruptcy courts may issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in matters in which the bankruptcy court cannot issue final orders.
Amid the economic hardships brought upon us by the Great Recession, the plight of cities, towns, and other municipalities across the U.S. has received a significant amount of media exposure. The media has been particularly interested in the spate of recent chapter 9 bankruptcy filings by Vallejo, Stockton, San Bernardino, and Mammoth Lakes, California; Jefferson County, Alabama; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; and Central Falls, Rhode Island. A variety of factors have combined to create a virtual maelstrom of woes for U.S.
On November 27, 2012, in a ruling that undoubtedly will impact the choice of venue for many large corporate bankruptcies in the future, Judge Shelley C. Chapman of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York transferred venue of the chapter 11 cases of Patriot Coal Corporation and ninety-eight of its affiliates to the Eastern District of Missouri.
On Dec. 4, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit delivered its long-awaited decision in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.). The Bellingham decision effectively clears away much of the analytical underbrush that had surrounded—at least in the 9th Circuit —several important post-Stern v. Marshall questions.
The trustee in the bankruptcy of an LLC member asked the Bankruptcy Court for a declaration that the LLC was dissolved pursuant to its operating agreement. The operating agreement mandated dissolution upon the bankruptcy of a member, but the court denied the trustee’s motion, relying on provisions in the Bankruptcy Act that trump contractual limitations. In re Warner, 480 B.R. 641 (Bankr. N.D. W.Va. Sept. 27, 2012).
On November 28, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit published an opinion affirming the bankruptcy court’s ruling that the Mexican Plan of Reorganization (the “Concurso Plan”) of the Mexican glass-manufacturing company, Vitro, S.A.B.
In an important opinion released on November 27, 2012, Judge Shelley C. Chapman of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York transferred the Patriot Coal Corporation (Patriot Coal) chapter 11 bankruptcy cases from the Southern District of New York to the Eastern District of Missouri. This decision comes as a surprise to many observers who had expected, based on prior failed attempts to change venue in Enron and other large cases filed in the Southern District of New York, that Judge Chapman would defer to the Debtor’s choice of venue.