Introduction

U.S. courts generally agree that the substantive consolidation should be applied sparingly, and even more so when substantive consolidation of debtors with non-debtors is sought. While many opinions address the grounds for substantive consolidation, very few cases address standing and notice issues when the sought for consolidation is of non-debtor entities. The Oklahoma bankruptcy court recently addressed these two issues in SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Stewart.

In a significant decision that reinforced the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior plurality decision in Marathon, the Court determined that while bankruptcy courts have the statutory authority to hear state-law compulsory counterclaims to a creditor’s proof of claim under section 157(b)(2)(C) of Title 28, Article III of the U.S. Constitution requires such proceedings to be heard by Article III judges where they would not be resolved as part of the claims allowance process.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that for cram-down valuations, 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) requires the use of “replacement value” based upon the adoption of the replacement value standard in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 956 (1997).

Filing a proof of claim with a bankruptcy court representing a debt subject to an expired state law limitations period does not violate the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) under an opinion released yesterday from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

Under the ruling, in Owens v. LVNV, the Seventh Circuit joins the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s holding under Crawford v. LVNV that such proofs of claim violate the FDCPA.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that a secured creditor must file its proof of claim no later than the 90-day deadline under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3002(c) in order to receive distributions under a Chapter 13 plan of reorganization.

A copy of the opinion is available here:  Link to Opinion.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of an adversary proceeding without leave to amend, holding that:

(a) the debtors failed to state a claim for wrongful foreclosure under California law;

(b) the debtors failed to state a claim for breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because they were not third-party beneficiaries of the pooling and servicing agreement;

Reversing a bankruptcy court order in favor of the debtor, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland recently held that a bank that had allowed amounts to be withdrawn from a home equity credit line after the HELOC had been frozen could still recover those amounts from the debtor.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently held that a wholly unsecured second mortgage lien may be “stripped off,” even if the property encumbered by the lien is no longer part of the bankruptcy estate due to abandonment by the bankruptcy trustee.

The Bankruptcy Court did not specifically reference the consolidated cases now before the U.S. Supreme Court in Bank of Amer. v. Toledo-Cardona, and Bank of Amer. v. Caulkett, which should resolve the issue of whether a wholly unsecured lien may be stripped off in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

In a bankruptcy preferential transfer dispute, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently held that the bankruptcy trustee could recover true overdraft covering deposits, while deposits covering intra-day overdrafts were not recoverable.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.