The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the “Second Circuit”) on February 7, 2011 issued an opinion rejecting the often used gifting doctrine in the context of a plan of reorganization on the one hand, while affirming vote designation for claims not purchased in good faith on the other.In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 350480 (2d Cir. Feb. 7, 2011).
Background
Following various disputes as to the scope of the collateral given to secured creditors, the debtors and certain of their noteholders jointly proposed a chapter 11. The plan included a rights offering that the consenting noteholders agreed to backstop. These consenting noteholders were granted the right to purchase significant equity of the reorganized debtors at a discount and receive significant premiums for their agreement to backstop the rights offering and support the plan.
The doctrine of substantive consolidation (generally- the power of a bankruptcy court to consolidate the assets and liabilities of affiliated entities in bankruptcy) is a recognized remedy exercised by bankruptcy courts – one that strikes fear into the hearts of many lenders. Justifiably so. The doctrine can be employed to order the substantive consolidation of related-debtor entities in bankruptcy and it can also be employed to substantively consolidate the assets of a debtor in bankruptcy with those of a related entity that is not a debtor in bankruptcy.
Courts generally agree that pre-petition agreements to forgo the protec-tions of bankruptcy are invalid as against public policy. A recent Tenth Cir-cuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision calls this accepted premise into question by holding that provisions contained in a limited liability company agreement that expressly barred the company, and restricted the manager, from filing a bankruptcy petition were enforceable. DB Capital Holdings, LLC v. Aspen HH Ventures, LLC (In re DB Capital Holdings, LLC), No. 10-046, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4176 (B.A.P. 10th Cir., Dec.
Sutton 58 Associates LLC v. Pilevsky et al., is a New York case which gets to the heart of the enforceability of classic single-purpose entity restrictions in commercial real estate lending. At issue is how far a third-party may go to cause a violation of a borrower’s SPE covenants, and whether those covenants are enforceable at all.
A Defaulted Construction Loan and Frustrated Attempts to Foreclose:
Addressing a novel issue in In re: International Oil Trading Company, LLC, 548 B.R. 825 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2016), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently denied in part an involuntary debtor’s motion to compel production of communications between the judgment creditor who had filed the involuntary bankruptcy petition and the petitioner’s litigation funder. The Court found that the attorney-client privilege and work product protection were applicable to certain disclosures made to the litigation funder, a non-lawyer third-party.
The year 2009 set a record for defaults and restructurings. Ownership of companies changed rapidly and, given the freeze up in capital markets, most of the new capital structures were significantly deleveraged, leaving little role for pre-existing sponsors and other equity holders of troubled companies. Halfway through 2010, even though actual bankruptcies have declined, restructuring continues through an amendment and forbearance process that is driven by the potential consequences to stakeholders in a court supervised restructuring.
Bankruptcy Rule 2004 allows the examination of any entity with respect to various topics, including conduct and financial condition of the debtor and any matter that may affect the administration of the estate. Does a subordination agreement that is silent on the use of Rule 2004 prevent the subordinated creditor from taking a Rule 2004 examination of the senior creditor? Yes, says an Illinois bankruptcy court.
On May 26, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, so long as parties knowingly and voluntarily consent, a bankruptcy court can issue final orders on matters that it otherwise would not have the constitutional authority to decide. In Wellness Int’l Network v. Sharif,1 a highly anticipated decision, the majority of the Supreme Court delivered a pragmatic opinion that quelled fears stemming from the Court’s 2011 decision in Stern v.
The next few years will see the “redevelopment” of the law in two critical areas involving bank failures where the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-tion (“FDIC”) is appointed receiver: (i) the relative rights and claims of creditors of a bank or savings and loan holding company, including the FDIC; and (ii) D&O and professional liability. Significant decisions are be-ginning to be issued with regard to the former.