TiBs frequently assign the right to recover debts due to the bankrupt’s estate. The advantage to the TiB is that he receives a lump sum or a share of the proceeds of a successful claim for the benefit of the bankrupt’s creditors without having to fund and pursue litigation himself. In most cases, once a TiB has assigned the right to recover the debt that will be the end of the matter; he just has to wait for the litigation to be concluded when payment of the agreed share will be made. A recent Court of Appeal decision means that this will not always be the case.

Earlier this year, the High Court gave judgment in a case involving a bankrupt who owned property in Morocco (Saunders v Donovan, unreported). The bankrupt had also granted someone a power of attorney in respect of the Moroccan property. The question that fell to be decided by the High Court was four-fold:

In Re Ruiz (a bankrupt) [2011] EWHC 913 (Fam) the High Court ruled that a wife’s right to occupy the matrimonial home did not prevent her husband’s trustee in bankruptcy (TiB) gaining and enforcing a proprietary interest in the property.

The Facts

M and G married in 2001 and moved into a house purchased by M and registered in his sole name. In 2006 divorce proceedings were initiated, following which G obtained a freezing order over M’s assets and an occupation order over the marital home.  

BIS and Treasury have published their response to the consumer credit elements of the Government review of consumer credit and personal insolvency. The response explains the initiative that will ensure that over 85% of customers with personal current accounts will see clearer, fairer and more manageable charges for unarranged overdrafts. Customers will be able to get alerts when their balance is low and will not incur a fee if they exceed their limit by a small amount. Also, from late 2013 there will be guaranteed account switching within seven days.

The Supreme Court’s decision in a dispute over a parent company guarantee will change the way insolvency practitioners deal with the distribution of assets when a corporate group collapses.

The Supreme Court recently considered the scope of the anti-deprivation principle, in Belmont Park Investments PTY Limited (respondent) v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc (appellant) [2011] UKSC 38 (Belmont). Understanding the scope of this principle is important for anyone entering a contract where the parties’ rights and obligations change if one of them enters an insolvency procedure. Robert Spedding explains how the courts applied the principle in Belmont and makes some practical suggestions for avoiding problems.

Application for an administration order in respect of FM Front Door Ltd. The application followed FM’s failure to make payments under a loan from the Dunfermline Building Society obtained to assist with the purchase of flats at the Skyline development on Finniestoun Street in Glasgow.  The loan was secured by a floating charge and standard securities over each of the flats. FM’s parent company FM Developments also granted a guarantee for the loan.

Clause 13 of the loan agreement provided that the grounds for default included:

What happens if one party to a contract fails to perform? Can the innocent party get all of its losses back? What happens if the losses are difficult to prove?

Here, we look at what you can claim and how to protect your position.

The general rule

Damages for breach of contract are usually intended to compensate the injured party for its losses arising naturally from the breach or which were within the parties' contemplation when the contract was made.

The Masri litigation has yet again troubled the English Court on the principle of comity and provided the Court of Appeal with the opportunity to say just how important it is in international debt enforcement.

The background on Masri

In Rainy Sky S.A and six others v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, the Supreme Court provided useful guidance on the role of business common sense in construing a clause in a commercial contract, particularly in circumstances where there are competing plausible constructions, neither of which is clearly preferable on the language used alone.

The facts