Earlier this month, GameTech International, Inc., and various related entities (collectively, "GameTech"), filed chapter 11 petitions for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. According to GameTech's Declaration in Support of its Chapter 11 Petitions (the "Decl."), the company entered the electronic bingo business in 1994 and the video lottery terminal ("VLT") and slot machine business in 2007. Decl.
To a business litigator, the bankruptcy debtor’s most effective weapon is often the automatic stay, which is commonly used – or abused, depending on the perspective – to, inter alia, stay all pending litigation against the debtor and keep him in sole control of an asset, despite seeming abuses of that control.
On July 9, 2012, the Seventh Circuit decided in Sunbeam1 that the rejection of a trademark license by a bankrupt trademark licensor does not deprive the trademark licensee of its right to continue to use the trademark, and disagreed with the 1985 Fourth Circuit decision in Lubrizol2 that held to the contrary.3 In reaction to the Lubrizol decision, which held that the rejection of a license by a bankrupt licensor of intellectual property terminated the rights of the licensee, Congress enacted Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy
The Government must provide actual notice of forfeiture proceedings to those the Government knows have claimed an interest in property to be forfeited. In a fact pattern the Sixth Circuit characterized as "befitting a John Grisham novel," the Government dug up (literally) a fraudster’s $250,000 on a golf course. The Government found the money in October 2009 and instituted forfeiture proceedings. In November and December 2009, the Government posted a generalized notice of forfeiture on the internet.
On June 28, 2012, Judge Allan Gropper of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York declined to appoint an official committee of equity holders in Kodak’s chapter 11 cases. The bankruptcy court determined that the appointment of an official committee was not warranted at that time, given that the costs to the bankruptcy estates would be substantial and equity’s interests were already represented by other constituencies seeking to maximize value and by a sophisticatedad hoc group of shareholders. In re Eastman Kodak Company, Case No
One of the benefits to a corporate form of entity is the protection of shareholders from liability for obligations of the corporation. Of course, as we all know, there are still legal claims which could impose liability on a corporate shareholder for obligations of the corporation. In a recent case, a former executive of a corporation tried to assert a tortious interference claim against a majority shareholder, when it terminated severance payments that were owed to the executive. (Nation v. American Capital, Ltd., 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, Case No.
On May 18, 2012, the Arizona Supreme Court issued an opinion in Hogan v. Washington Mutual Bank, N.A., et al., CV-11-0115-PR, holding that Arizona’s non-judicial foreclosure statutes do not require the beneficiary to show the original promissory note for the trustee to notice and conclude a non-judicial trustee’s sale.
On June 22, 2012, Ritz Camera & Image, LLC, and various related entities (collectively, the "Debtors" or "Ritz II"), filed chapter 11 petitions for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. Those familiar with Ritz Camera know that the company's predecessor, Ritz Camera Centers, Inc.
In February the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois held in Crane v.
On July 9, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued a decision in Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Mfg., LLC (No. 11-3920), a case that addresses the effect of a bankruptcy trustee's rejection of trademark licenses. For years, the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "intellectual property" has excluded trademarks. But the Code provides very specific guidelines on the treatment of other intellectual property licenses in section 365(n), which was added by Congress in 1988 following the Fourth Circuit's decision in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc.