It is not uncommon for a supplier of goods or services to receive a demand letter or adversary complaint alleging that it received avoidable transfers—commonly known as "preferential payments" or "preferences"—during the 90 days preceding a customer's bankruptcy filing. Such claims arise under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, and can result in a supplier having to return certain payments made during the 90-day preference period.

In the case of Coughlin v. South Canaan Cellular Investments, LLC, C.A. No. 7202-VCL (Del. Ch. July 6, 2012), Respondents made a request for fee shifting under the bad-faith exception to the American Rule.  In reviewing this fee shifting request, the Court found that Respondents’ request itself was unfounded, and coupled with Respondents’ own conduct in the case, instead awarded Petitioner his fees in costs in the amount of $17,906.

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004(a) states that "[o]n motion of any party in interest, the court may order the examination of any entity."  Courts construing Rule 2004(a) have found its scope "unfettered and broad."  In re Washington Mutual, Inc., 408 B.R. 45, 49 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009), citing In re Bennett Funding Group, Inc., 203 B.R. 24, 28 (Bankr. N. D. N.Y. 1996).  Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004(b) establishes some of the parameters of what is commonly referred to as a "Rule 2004 Examination":

In the aftermath of the economic recession, US cities, towns and other municipalities facing the threat of budgetary and financial catastrophe are turning to Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code for protection.

Since it was decided in June 2011, countless scholars and courts have weighed in on the impact and implications of the Supreme Court’s seminal opinion in Stern v. Marshall.

On June 6, 2012, Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved a $2.875 million key employee incentive plan (“KEIP”) in the Velo Holdings bankruptcy cases over the objection of the U.S. Trustee finding that it was primarily incentivizing and a sound exercise of the debtors’ business judgment.  Inre Velo Holdings Inc., Case No. 12-11384 (MG), 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 2535 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).  The decision follows well-settled law in the Southern District and Delaware regarding approval of KEIPs.

The Second Circuit recently issued its opinion in the DBSD N.A., Inc. bankruptcy case addressing several bankruptcy issues that have received wide-spread reporting, including the validity of the "gifting” doctrine and the standing of an "out of the money" creditor to object to confirmation of a chapter 11 plan. A lesser publicized issue addressed in the decision, but one that should signal a warning to claim purchaser’s of bankrupt companies, was the designation of a vote of DISH Network Inc. on DBSD's plan under section 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Every lender sincerely hopes that, even when its borrower is flat on the floor and seems down for the proverbial count, the borrower will still find the wherewithal to repay it. A lender often starts counting the days after it is repaid until the 90-day preference period (11 U.S.C. §547) has passed. The lender generally breathes a sigh of relief on the 91st day, confident that if its borrower files for bankruptcy, the money paid to the lender is safe from being clawed back by the Bankruptcy Court.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, applying federal law, has held that a Liquidation Trustee and a Litigation Trustee (the Trustees) did not have standing to object to the disbursal of policy proceeds in an insurer’s interpleader action because they had no existing claims or realistic potential claims for coverage under the policy. Federal Insurance Co. v. DBSI, Inc., 2012 WL 2501090 (Bankr. D. Del. June 27, 2012).

Real property receivers are most commonly appointed at the request of secured creditors who are often charged with the expenses of the receivership. However, secured creditors are not the only parties who may petition for the appointment of a real property receiver.