The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently issued an opinion confirming a chapter 11 plan (i) based on a lock-up agreement between the debtor and its major creditors and (ii) containing third party releases that bound creditors unless they affirmatively "opted out" in a ballot actually returned to the balloting agent.

As Ohio enjoys its latest boom in oil and gas exploration, it is important to understand how oil and gas leases are treated in bankruptcy. Unsettled Ohio law regarding whether a debtor owns unextracted oil and gas as part of the debtor’s real property can make this a difficult issue. 

The recent case ofGreb v. Diamond International Corp. highlights the need for dissolved corporations and their insurers to consider the survival statute of their state of incorporation when defending against actions brought in California.

On December 13, 2012, Judge Vincent L. Briccetti from the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York denied the appellant Notes Trustee’s request to compel payment of an administrative expense claim.

In Greb v. Diamond Int’l Corp., 2013 WL 628328 (Cal. Feb. 21, 2013), the California Supreme Court unequivocally and unanimously laid to rest the assertion that dissolved foreign corporations may be sued in California after the time of the statute of limitations provided by the laws under which the foreign corporations were incorporated.

The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, equating a covenant not to sue under a patent with a license, has concluded that a trustee in bankruptcy cannot unilaterally reject the covenant as an executory contract.  In re Spansion, Case Nos. 11-3323, -3324 (3rd Cir., Dec. 21, 2012) (Scirica, J.).

Spansion and Apple settled a patent dispute at the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) regarding flash memory products, with Spansion agreeing to dismiss its case and to refrain from filing related actions.  In pertinent part, the agreement stated:

In a pro-debtor opinion released on February 26, 2013, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a debtor may “artificial impair” claims in a class to obtain an impaired and accepting class of claims as required by section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code. Western Real Estate Equities, L.L.C. v. Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P.), No. 12-10271, 2013 WL 690497 (5th Cir. Feb. 26, 2013).

Statutory Background to the Artificial Impairment Issue

In a ruling on February 28, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois reversed the February 29, 2012 order of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois allowing a bankruptcy trustee to avoid an Illinois mortgage as to unsecured creditors for lack of “constructive notice” because the mortgage did not expressly state the maturity date of and interest rate on the underlying debt (In Re Crane, Case 12-2146, U.S. Dist. Ct., C.D. IL, February 28, 2013).

The School Specialty chapter 11 case began in what has become all too typical fashion. The company, overleveraged and short of cash, had no choice but to accept a lifeline extended by its second lien secured lender, a private investment fund. The terms of the debtor in possession (“DIP”) financing

Fashion industry licensees invest substantial sums in reliance on their license rights. Bankrupt licensors have been able to convince courts they can “reject” licenses and, when so doing, thereby cause licensees’ trademark rights to vaporize. Here we discuss why and what a licensee can do.

The Effect of Rejection on Trademark License Rights