Many bankruptcy practitioners are familiar with the general tenet that an obligation secured only by a mortgage on the Debtor’s principal residence is immune from modification or avoidance by the Debtor. Sections 1123(b)(5) and 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code protect residential mortgages from being “stripped-down” to the value of the subject real estate or subjecting the terms of the underlying obligation to modification.
On May 5, 2010, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision declaring that a party’s right to setoff in an ISDA Master Agreement is unenforceable in bankruptcy unless strict mutuality exists. (Decision and Order).
A bankruptcy court recently held that in order for a supplier of goods on credit to establish an administrative claim under Bankruptcy Code section 503(b)(9) in the bankruptcy case of its buyer, the supplier will need to show that its buyer "physically" received the goods within 20 days prior to the buyer's bankruptcy filing, regardless of when title to the goods passed. In Re Circuit City Stores, Inc., et al., Case No. 08-35653, No. 7149 (Bankr. E.D. VA April 8, 2010).
On May 5, 2009, Judge James Peck, the Bankruptcy Judge in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases, held that the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not override the mutuality requirements for setoff under section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. As a consequence, the Bankruptcy Court prohibited Swedbank, a non-debtor counter party to a swap agreement, from setting off pre-petition claims against Lehman against funds collected for Lehman’s account postpetition. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Bankr. Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
According to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, a lack of bad faith is no longer a defense to court sanctions for failure to produce documents in a timely manner. That court, in In re A&M Florida Properties II, recently awarded sanctions against both a party and its counsel for the counsel’s failure to become familiar with the client’s email and data-retention policies and systems— despite the absence of any bad faith or willful delay.1
A recent Delaware bankruptcy court decision1 on the ability of “bankruptcy remote” single-purpose entities emphasizes the complicated nature of the bankruptcy process and the issues that need to be considered when using “bankruptcy remote” entities in funding structures. Given the prevalence of such entities, this is an important decision for all participants in the structured fi nance industry.
These are tough times in the hotel business. The recession has squeezed room rates and net operating income. The credit crunch means new borrowing is available only at lower loan to value ratios near 50%, on already beaten down values. At the same time, many tens of billions of dollars of existing hotel loans are maturing or otherwise in default, leaving the owners with little ability to sell or refinance at for amounts sufficient to pay off existing debt.
Value is the central feature of any real estate restructuring, whether you are a debtor in need of cash, a creditor looking to recover collateral or an equity holder considering an additional investment.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently issued an opinion in the case of In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. that significantly restricts the scope of setoff rights for energy traders and other participants in derivatives and forward commodity markets. Traditionally, bankruptcy law has required mutuality between the debtor and a creditor as a prerequisite for the exercise of setoff rights by the creditor.
This paper is designed to provide a brief update of recent decisions of note that concern various ethical issues bankruptcy attorneys often encounter, focusing on conflicts of interest and privilege issues.