The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments this week in the case of Czyzewski v.

Judge Carey in the District of Delaware recently ruled on an intriguing question—can a defendant in a preference action reduce the amount of a recoverable preference by setting off the value of an allowed administrative expense claim?. Though not late-breaking news, this case provides a thorough examination of the essential character of administrative expense claims.

In its recent decision in Tempnology LLC, n/k/a Old Cold, LLC v. Mission Product Holdings, Inc. (In re Tempnology LLC), No. 15-065 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. Nov. 18, 2016), the U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit (“the BAP”) rejected the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir.

In the Limitless Mobile, LLC bankruptcy proceeding (Delaware Bankruptcy Case No. 16-12685), a formation meeting has been scheduled for December 16, 2016 at 10:00 a.m. (ET) at the J. Caleb Boggs Federal Building, 844 King Street, Room 3209, Wilmington, DE 19801. Click Here for a copy of the Notice of Formation Meeting for Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors issued by the Office of the United States Trustee.

The United States Supreme Court will review a decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, to resolve a dispute between the circuits regarding whether the Bankruptcy Code provides the exclusive mechanism to determine the validity of a Proof of Claim or whether the filing of a faulty Proof of Claim gives rise to a debtor’s right to sue under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the “FDCPA”). The Bankruptcy Code permits a creditor to file a claim if, among other things, the creditor has a right to payment.

“Any ... suit [against creditors’ committee members for their official acts] must be brought in the bankruptcy court, or in another court only with the express permission of the bankruptcy court,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 28, 2016. In re Yellowstone Mountain Club LLC, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21187, *9 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2016).

The First Circuit recently issued an important interpretation of bankruptcy law that directly impacts trademark licensing rights. In In re Tempnology LLC, 559 B.R. 809 (1st Cir. BAP 2016), the First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that a debtor-licensor’s rejection of a trademark licensing agreement “did not vaporize” the licensee’s contractual right to use the debtor’s mark and logo.

The Barton doctrine, which has been imposed in “an unbroken line of cases … as a matter of federal common law,” In re Linton, 136 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J.), requires that plaintiffs “obtain authorization from the bankruptcy court before initiating an action in another forum against certain officers appointed by the bankruptcy court for actions the officers have taken in their official capacities.” In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, No. 14-35363, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 6936595, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov.

Many bankruptcy cases involve adversary proceedings in which creditors seek to have certain debts deemed nondischargeable. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (the “District Court”) recently considered, on appeal, whether the Bankruptcy Court properly held that a debt owed by a debtor (the “Debtor”) to the State of Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency (the “Agency”) is dischargeable in a Chapter 13 case.1

Like the wild prairie rose that punctuates the North Dakota plains, the issue of whether a debtor can reject its midstream agreements is back after a brief period of dormancy. In Hot Topics in Oil and Gas Restructurings, Volume 3, we described how the U.S.