What can a lender do about successive bankruptcy filings by a borrower? What can lessors do when their tenants file successive bankruptcy petitions? A recent decision by a bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of New York gives guidance on these questions.

(6th Cir. B.A.P. Jan. 4, 2017)

The Sixth Circuit B.A.P. affirms the bankruptcy court’s decision and order denying the trustee’s request for turnover of funds paid to the debtor’s criminal defense attorney. The debtor’s mother had made the transfer from a bank account held jointly with the debtor. The trustee failed to meet the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the attorney fee was property of the estate, and thus turnover was inappropriate. Because the debtor had no claim to the fee, the trustee had no claim for turnover. Opinion below.

Last week, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that a PRP’s bankruptcy settlement of its CERCLA liability did not bar that PRP from later seeking contribution for a share of the settlement – despite the bankruptcy court’s determination that the settlement represented the PRP’s “fair share” of CERCLA liability.

A decision rendered during the sometimes peaceful interlude between Christmas and New Year’s is worth reading, and heeding. Hurston v. Anzo (In re Hurston), Adv. Proc. No. 15-2026 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 27, 2016) is a helpful reminder to anyone representing lenders or creditors which are hell-bent-for-leather to pursue a non-dischargeability claim against a debtor that submits a false written statement (e.g., a personal financial statement) to obtain credit.

In an order issued today, Judge Dalton of the Middle District of Florida held that in a non-bankruptcy context, allegations that collection of a mortgage debt is barred by the statute of limitations do not form a “plausible basis” for claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, or the Declaratory Judgment Act.

A unanimous panel held that Asarco’s settlement in bankruptcy for its “share of response costs” did not preclude it from later bringing a CERCLA contribution claim.

The decision provides some additional, though limited protection for licensees of trademarks in bankruptcy proceedings

Introduction

In In re Tempnology LLC,1 the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (the BAP) for the First Circuit provided additional clarity regarding the rights of intellectual property licensees under section 365(n) of the United States Bankruptcy Code,2 particularly with respect to trademark licenses. In Tempnology, the First Circuit BAP concluded that:

Section 365(n) extends only to licenses of "intellectual property" as defined in the Bankruptcy Code,3

In the recent decision ofIn re: Abeinsa Holding Inc. et al., Del. Bankr. Ct. Dec. 14, 2016), Case No. 1:16-bk-10790, the Honorable Kevin J. Carey confirmed clean energy developer Abeinsa Holding Inc.’s Chapter 11 plan, which is part of the $16.5 billion global restructuring for Spanish parent Abengoa SA.

(N.D. Ind. Dec. 22, 2016)

The district court affirms the bankruptcy court’s order lifting the stay to permit the creditor to proceed with the real property foreclosure action. The debtor failed to provide factual or legal support for his claims of fraud by the creditor. Opinion below.

Judge: Miller

Plaintiff: Pro Se

Attorneys for Defendants: Dykema Gossett PLLC, Jordan S. Huttenlocker, Louis S. Chronowski

(Bankr. W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2016)