On March 26, 2019, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming a decision by the District Court emanating out of the Puerto Rico Title III bankruptcy cases, found that Sections 928(a) and 922(d) of the Bankruptcy Code “permit, but do not require, continued payment during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings.”[i] The First Circuit found that these provisions pr
As discussed in an earlier post called “Moving Up: Bankruptcy Code Dollar Amounts Will Increase On April 1, 2019,” various dollar amounts in the Bankruptcy Code and related statutory provisions were increased for cases filed on or after today, April 1, 2019.
Ohio and other states where Frost Brown Todd has offices have long had witness and/or notary requirements for the execution of mortgages. Ohio Revised Code Section 5301.01 provides that a “mortgage . . . shall be signed by the . . . mortgagor. . . . The signing shall be acknowledged by the . . . mortgagor . . . before a . . . notary public . . .
Perhaps one thing we can agree on in discussing the healthcare industry: it is in a state of distress stemming from the challenges created by an ever-increasing regulatory burden, changes in reimbursement rates, uncertainty with the Affordable Care Act, mounting tort and employment litigation. The recent rampant growth of urgent care centers and retail clinics as well as technological advances and telemedicine have created a change in the manner in which healthcare services are delivered and consequently put pressure on providers to compete.
On March 25, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dealt another setback to plaintiffs trying to establish Article III standing to assert a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (“FCRA”). In five related FCRA appeals combined in Jaras v. Equifax, Inc., 2019 WL 1373198 (9th Cir. Mar.
Collateral descriptions in financing statements are often an afterthought for secured creditors, and are frequently prepared in the simplest way possible, sometimes due to carelessness, sometimes because the debtor wishes to maintain its privacy by not disclosing specific pieces of collateral or investments, and sometimes due to administrative simplicity to minimize the cost and hassle of future amendments to financing statements in deals where the debtor regularly exchanges collateral of the same type.
What are the limits of a bankruptcy court’s authority to issue final orders and judgments? Does a bankruptcy court have authority under Article III of the U.S. Constitution to enter final orders in quintessential bankruptcy matters such as fraudulent transfer claims, or are the court’s powers more constrained? While the Supreme Court’s rulings in Stern v. Marshall, 546 U.S. 462 (2011), Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25 (2014) and Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct.
In a consignment distribution model, a third party Warehouse (the consignee) takes possession of goods on behalf of a Vendor (the consignor) for sale to Customers.
On March 18, 2019, Judge Stuart M. Bernstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision enforcing a mortgage lender’s claim for a prepayment premium (a/k/a make-whole or yield maintenance premium) notwithstanding the lender’s prepetition acceleration of the loan due to the debtor’s default.
In In re 1141 Realty Owner LLC, et al., No. 18-12341 (SMB), 2019 WL 1270818 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. March 18, 2019), Bankruptcy Judge Stuart M. Bernstein of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York recently reaffirmed that upon sufficient contractual language, "make whole" prepayment premiums are enforceable under New York law even after loan acceleration. The court emphasized that the language of the contract provided for such a result and that this was an enforceable liquidated damages clause under New York law.